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ABSTRACT
Momentum Trading and Limits to Arbitrage. (May 2012 )
William Joseph Armstrong, B.S., University of Colorado, Boulder; M.B.A., Texas
A&M University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sorin Sorescu
An extensive body of research supports the momentum strategy’s persistence but
disagrees on the underlying source of its profitability. A key obstacle to distinguish-
ing between behavioral and rational explanations of momentum is that mispricing is
unobservable. This dissertation studies the endogenous relationship between momen-
tum trading and mispricing. The basic idea is that momentum trades can impede
arbitrage when they are in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades and reinforce
arbitrage when they are in the same direction. A simple model suggests that when
momentum trades reinforce the arbitrage process, momentum strategy returns con-
tain relatively less mispricing than when momentum trades impede the arbitrage
process. Empirical results show that an arbitrage-reinforcing strategy has signifi-
cantly higher average returns that are largely related to risk and do not reverse in
subsequent periods, while an arbitrage-impeding strategy exhibits significant long-
term reversal consistent with more mispricing. Additional tests show that winners
have higher future growth rates than losers consistent with cross-sectional differences
in expected returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that momentum profitability is
largely related to risk which is partially masked by mispricing. An important impli-
cation of this model is that, like noise traders, trading strategies that do not condition
on relative value can impede arbitrage.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that a momentum strategy formed with a
long position in recent winners and a short position in recent losers generates positive
and significant returns for up to 12 months following portfolio formation. They also
show that returns to the underlying stocks exhibit significant return reversal in the
second and third years following portfolio formation. The ensuing literature generally
suggests that momentum strategy returns are robust to risk-adjustment, persist in
out-of-sample tests, and exist in international markets.
While the empirical literature strongly supports the persistence of the momentum
strategy, there is significant disagreement as to the underlying source(s) of its prof-
itability. Behavioral explanations suggest that momentum is the result of mispricing
caused by behavioral biases of market participants, while rational explanations sug-
gest that momentum is the result of cross-sectional differences in expected returns
due to time-varying or omitted risk factors. In spite of the significant differences in
the underlying source(s) of momentum profitability, behavioral and rational models
generate similar predictions because they are designed to explain the return pattern
observed in the data (e.g. short-term continuation and long-term reversal).
In this paper I use the endogenous relationship between momentum trading and
security mispricing to analyze rational and behavioral explanations of momentum.
A key obstacle to separating behavioral and rational explanations is that mispricing
is unobservable. Behavioral models suggest that momentum profits are the result
of mispricing which is generated when investors trade in a biased manner. Mis-
pricing can be due to either investor overreaction where investors push prices away
from fundamental value, or investor underreaction where new information is not
fully incorporated into prices. In an efficient market, mispricing should be fleeting
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Finance.
2as arbitrageurs quickly eliminate any mispricing (e.g. Fama (1965)). If momen-
tum profits are the result of mispricing, there should be some market friction that
enables mispricing to persist.
Theoretical work in the limits to arbitrage literature suggests that arbitrage is
risky and that under certain conditions mispricing may persist, and perhaps deepen.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) show that arbitrageurs will reduce
their investment in a mispriced security if there is a risk that noise traders will cause
mispricing to deepen resulting in a short-term loss on the arbitrageur’s position. The
ensuing literature suggests that arbitrage intensity will be reduced when arbitrageurs
are risk-averse, invest using other peoples’ money, or incur holding costs.
The basic idea of this dissertation is that arbitrageurs may reduce arbitrage in-
tensity when momentum trades are expected to push prices away from fundamental
value. Similarly, arbitrageurs may increase arbitrage intensity when they expect mo-
mentum trades to reinforce the arbitrage process and help correct mispricing faster.
Stocks in the former case should contain relatively more mispricing, while stocks in
the latter case should contain relatively less mispricing. In Appendix A I develop a
simple model that demonstrates the effect of momentum trades on arbitrage inten-
sity and mispricing. The model suggests that stocks should contain relatively more
mispricing when momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades
and relatively less mispricing when trades are aligned.
To empirically test behavioral and rational explanations of momentum, I combine
the direction of momentum trades with a proxy for the direction of arbitrage trades.
Since mispricing is unobservable, I use a measure of relative misvaluation as a proxy
for the direction of arbitrage trades.1 Measures of relative misvaluation proxy for
the information set of the average arbitrageur as they capture deviations in a firm’s
equity valuation relative to peer firm valuations. If the measure reasonably captures
1For the purpose of this paper it is not critical that the measure of relative misvaluation distin-
guishes between mispricing and unobserved differences in expected returns. The arbitrageur does
not directly observe mispricing and thus must make investments based on relative differences in
valuation after controlling for observable differences in discount rates and expected cashflows.
3the direction of arbitrage trades then an arbitrageur should profit by buying (selling)
stocks that appear to be undervalued (overvalued) relative to its peers.
In this paper the primary measure of relative misvaluation is estimated using the
valuation framework developed in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)
which measures the value of a firm relative to its industry peers after controlling for
differences in observable accounting information.2 Detailed portfolio and regression
analyses demonstrate that relatively undervalued stocks have significantly higher
returns than relatively overvalued stocks. These results are robust to risk-adjustment,
stronger in recent winners, and stronger in the period following the publication of
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Overall, these findings support using this measure as
a proxy for the direction of arbitrage trades.
Using the predictions of the model and the direction of arbitrage trades, I con-
struct two conditional momentum strategies: one using stocks where momentum
trades are likely to impede arbitrage and one using stocks where trades are likely
to reinforce arbitrage. If arbitrageurs adjust their capital intensity according to the
expected level of momentum trades, stocks where momentum trades impede arbi-
trage should contain relatively more mispricing than stocks where trades reinforce
arbitrage. If momentum profitability is the result of mispricing, the strategy where
momentum trades impede arbitrage should have relatively higher average returns.
Contrary to this prediction, I find that the strategy where momentum trades rein-
force arbitrage, and is expected to contain relatively less mispricing, has significantly
higher returns that are more than double the returns to the strategy where momen-
tum trades impede arbitrage. I show that this difference in returns is robust to risk
adjustment and persistent across sub-periods.
The return reversal of momentum stocks over the two to five years following port-
folio formation is frequently cited as evidence of investor overreaction. While rational
2This approach is analogous to an integrated desktop analysis performed by a financial analyst who
values firms relative to their peers using a combination of measures such as M/B, P/E, ROE, and
leveraged cost of capital. As discussed in Section 2, the main results are robust to using alternative
proxies for the direction of arbitrage trades.
4models can replicate the short-term continuation observed in momentum strategies,
they have difficulty generating the magnitude of long-term reversal observed in the
data. If momentum profitability is due to investor overreaction (e.g. Daniel, Hir-
shleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)), long-term reversal should be stronger in the
strategy where momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades.
Consistent with this prediction, I find significant long-term reversal for up to five
years following portfolio formation when momentum trades impede the arbitrage pro-
cess, but no evidence of long-term reversal at any horizon when momentum trades
reinforce the arbitrage process. This evidence is consistent with a higher level of
mispricing when momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades.
The long-term reversal tests combined with the average returns of the conditional
strategies cast doubt on the ability of mispricing to explain average momentum
profitability. The subset of momentum stocks that appear to contain relatively more
mispricing also have significantly lower returns.
One could argue that the results so far only rule out mispricing from the per-
spective of investor overreaction, but not investor underreaction. Behavioral models
of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that
momentum profitability may result from a combination of investor overreaction and
investor underreaction. If momentum profitability is the result of investor underre-
action, this suggests that all market participants, including arbitrageurs, systemat-
ically underreact to observable, value-relevant information. However, the model in
Appendix A suggests that arbitrageurs will increase their capital intensity when mo-
mentum trades are expected to reinforce the arbitrage process (relative to the case of
no momentum trades). Thus, there should be little mispricing in momentum stocks
when arbitrageurs are able to observe past returns and infer that momentum trades
will aid in the correction of mispricing. If arbitrageurs supply sufficient capital to
eliminate mispricing due to investor underreaction, then momentum profits should
be largely due to cross-sectional differences in expected returns.
5To study the relationship between momentum profitability and cross-sectional
differences in expected returns I estimate the proportion of momentum strategy
returns that can be explained as compensation for risk exposure. The long-term
reversal findings suggest that at least a subset of momentum stocks are mispriced
and thus their returns may contain a mispricing component. The noise that mis-
pricing injects into the return series may confound empirical tests of risk exposure.
If momentum profitability is due to rational explanations rather than investor un-
derreaction, momentum returns should have higher exposure to priced risk factors
when the return series contains less mispricing. Empirical results show that a signif-
icantly larger proportion of momentum returns to the arbitrage-reinforcing strategy
are explained as compensation for risk. These results are robust across risk-models
including the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Chen, Roll, and
Ross (1986) macroeconomic risk factors. Using the Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986) fac-
tors I find that more than two-thirds of the realized momentum returns are explained
as risk compensation. These findings suggest that average momentum profitability
is largely explained by risk exposure rather than investor underreaction.
I also find that while the strategy where momentum trades impede arbitrage
loads significantly on priced risk factors such as the change in industrial production,
the significant level of mispricing masks the level of risk compensation and appears
to reduce the average returns in this strategy. Further tests provide evidence that
future sales and asset growth rates are increasing (decreasing) in the winners (losers)
groups of both strategies, yet there is significant reversion in the numerator of the
price-earning multiples for stocks where momentum trades impede arbitrage. These
findings are consistent with rational explanations of momentum profitability where
risk exposure is masked by a significant level of mispricing which appears to reduce
rather than explain momentum profitability.
I also find that returns to the momentum and value strategies interact in an inter-
esting manner. When the arbitrage-impeding momentum strategy is profitable, the
6value strategy earns zero returns. However, when momentum traders are unsuccess-
ful in pushing prices away from fundamental value, relative value traders earn profits
of almost one-percent per month. This finding provides further evidence consistent
with momentum trades impeding the arbitrage process.
While the existing literature supports the presence of mispricing (e.g. Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001)), this is the first paper (to my knowledge) that isolates the in-
fluence of mispricing on momentum profitability by conditioning empirical tests on
the expected level of mispricing. The evidence suggests that momentum profitability
is largely related to cross-sectional differences in expected returns. Long-term re-
versal, the strongest evidence supporting the presence of mispricing, is only present
in the least profitable conditional strategy and thus it appears unlikely that behav-
ioral explanations are the primary source of momentum profitability. The significant
proportion of momentum profits explained as compensation for risk mitigates claims
that momentum profits may be the result of investor underreaction. Further, the
mispricing component of momentum returns appears to mask the underlying cross-
sectional differences in expected returns between winners and losers.
Overall, it appears that the interaction of momentum traders and arbitrageurs has
implications for market efficiency. Momentum or relative strength traders appear to
impede arbitrage for relatively overvalued past winners and undervalued past losers.
The results suggest that, like noise traders, trading strategies that do not condition
on relative value can impose constraints on arbitrage activity.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the moti-
vation and empirical approach. Section 3 documents the relationship between mo-
mentum, misvaluation, and future returns. Section 4 documents the main results.
Section 5 discusses the interaction of the momentum strategy, value strategy, and
mispricing and Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides a simple model of the the
interaction of momentum traders and arbitrageurs.
72. MOMENTUM TRADING AND ARBITRAGE
2.1 Momentum
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that a momentum strategy formed with a long
position in recent winners and short position in recent losers generates significant and
positive returns for up to 12 months following portfolio formation. They also show
that returns to the underlying stocks exhibit reversal in the second and third years
following portfolio formation. An important aspect of the momentum strategy is
that portfolio formation is unconditional with respect to the fundamental value of
the underlying stocks. The empirical literature strongly supports the persistence
of the momentum strategy but does not agree on the underlying source(s) of its
profitability.1
Behavioral explanations generally model momentum as a temporary divergence
of market prices from fundamental values due to behavioral biases of market partic-
ipants (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999)). Rational explanations generally model
momentum as a divergence of market prices from predicted fundamental value that
is the result of time-variation in expected returns or omitted risk factors (e.g. John-
son (2002) and Sagi and Seasholes (2007)). In spite of the significant differences in
the underlying source(s) of momentum profitability, behavioral and rational models
generate similar predictions because they are designed to explain the return pattern
observed in the data (i.e. short-term continuation and long-term reversal).
If behavioral explanations are correct then momentum is the result of investor
biases that cause market prices to deviate from fundamental value. The literature
suggests that momentum returns could be the due to either investor underreaction
1See, for example, Fama and French (1996), Conrad and Kaul (1998), Rouwenhorst (1998),
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), Grundy and Martin (2001), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), Chor-
dia and Shivakumar (2002), Lewellen (2002), Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003), Cooper, Gutierrez, and
Hameed (2004), Fama and French (2008), Gutierrez and Kelley (2008), Liu and Zhang (2008), and
Novy-Marx (2011).
8or overreaction to value-relevant information. For example, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (1998) model momentum as the result of investor overreaction where
the investor is overconfident about the precision of his private information and is
biased in the way he reacts to new public information. Hong and Stein (1999) gen-
erate momentum using two types of traders, news watchers and momentum traders.
The biases of the news watchers cause them to underreact to the trading of other
news watchers. Thus information is slowly incorporated into prices leading to return
predictability. The model’s result is that momentum is initially generated by the un-
derreaction of the news watchers. Since momentum traders only condition on past
returns they start trading as news watchers incorporate information, but continue
trading after the news is fully incorporated leading them to push prices beyond the
fundamental value observed by the news watchers in aggregate. Both models gener-
ate the return pattern observed in the data: short-term return continuation which
generates momentum profits, and long-term reversal of the portion of returns that
are due to investor overreaction.
A key obstacle to distinguishing between behavioral and rational explanations is
that mispricing is unobservable. The existence of a persistent and profitable trad-
ing strategy that is the result of mispricing contradicts the very notion of market
efficiency. If momentum profits are the result of mispricing, there should be some
market friction that prevents the mispricing from being corrected. One approach to
ascertain when momentum stocks are likely to contain more mispricing is to identify
sources of risk for arbitrageurs which may lead to a reduction in arbitrage intensity.
A reduction in arbitrage intensity, all else equal, should result in relatively more
mispricing.
2.2 Limits to Arbitrage
In an efficient markets framework, arbitrageurs ensure that prices fully reflect all
available information and thus mispricing is transient (e.g. Fama (1965)). Shleifer
9and Vishny (1997) develop a model where an arbitrageur may reduce his invest-
ment if there is a positive probability of a performance shock that may require him
to raise more capital (or unwind his positions) before correction of the mispricing.
This reduction in arbitrage capital prevents the mispricing from being completely
eliminated. Similarly, arbitrageurs may anticipate noise traders pushing prices away
from fundamental value and reduce their investment in the arbitrage opportunity
(i.e. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), and Shleifer and Summers
(1990)). It seems reasonable that, like noise traders, momentum traders can impede
arbitrage if their trades increase the risk of a performance shock to arbitrageurs.
This paper considers momentum traders as a special case of noise traders in that the
volume and intensity of trading can be inferred by observing past returns.
In Appendix A I develop a simple model of the interaction of momentum traders
and arbitrageurs to examine the influence of mispricing on the profitability of the mo-
mentum strategy. The intuition is straightforward; momentum trades aligned with
arbitrage trades facilitate price convergence to fundamental value, while momentum
trades in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades slow price convergence and may
push prices further away from fundamental value.
If arbitrageurs anticipate momentum trades impeding price convergence, they
may reduce the level of capital committed towards the arbitrage opportunity. De
Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) show that arbitrageurs face the risk
that noise traders may push prices away from fundamental value leading arbitrageurs
to trade less aggressively. Kondor (2009) develops a model where a positive probabil-
ity of mispricing deepening can lead arbitrageurs to reduce their arbitrage intensity.
Thus unconditional momentum trading can lead to a reduction in arbitrage intensity
which allows mispricing to persist (or deepen).
Similarly, arbitrageurs may increase arbitrage intensity when they expect that
momentum trades will reinforce the arbitrage process. Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2002) show that when arbitrageurs become informed sequentially and incur holding
10
costs, they will delay arbitrage and try to ”time the market.” They argue that the
uncertainty around when other arbitrageurs will act on an opportunity leads to a
”synchronization risk”. The model in Appendix A suggests that visibility of past
returns can act as a coordination mechanism that reduces the synchronization risk
which, all else equal, enables arbitrageurs to act sooner when momentum traders re-
inforce the arbitrage process and later when momentum trades impede the arbitrage
process.
2.3 Empirical Methods
The model suggests that momentum stocks should contain relatively more mis-
pricing when momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades,
while stocks where trades are in the same direction as arbitrage trades will contain
relatively less mispricing. While the direction and intensity of momentum trades
can easily be inferred from past returns, the direction of arbitrage trades must be
inferred from proxies of relative misvaluation. To be an effective proxy for the direc-
tion of arbitrage trades, the measure should be based on observable, value-relevant
information and capture differences in valuation between a firm and its peers. As
arbitrageurs trade to generate profits, the measure should also predict returns in the
cross-section of stocks. That is, undervalued stocks should have relatively higher
returns than overvalued stocks.
Over the last three decades, researchers have identified a wide range of measures
which appear to predict returns in the cross-section of stocks.2 Whether the result
of behavioral or rational processes, cross-sectional return predictability generally im-
plies that relatively undervalued stocks have higher average returns than relatively
overvalued stocks. Expected returns to misvalued securities include the expected re-
2See, for example, Basu (1977), Banz (1981), De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Jegadeesh (1990),
Lehmann (1990), Fama and French (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Sloan (1996), Amihud
(2002), Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006), Daniel and Titman (2006), and Cooper, Gulen, and
Schill (2008).
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turn based on observed risk factors as well as the expected correction of the apparent
misvaluation. The misvaluation component, the source of cross-sectional predictabil-
ity, represents expected arbitrage profits in the case of true security mispricing or
unmodeled risk premia in the case of omitted risk factors or time-varying risk pre-
mia.3
A frequently used proxy for relative value is the market-to-book equity ratio
(M/B) or its inverse, the book-to-market equity ratio (B/M). The M/B ratio intu-
itively reflects the average market price for one dollar of the firm’s book equity. A
related measure, the industry-adjusted M/B equity ratio (MBE-IA), captures the
deviation in the market price for one dollar of book equity from the industry-average
price of book equity. Industry-adjustment captures the average price of intangibles
within an industry which may differ from the market wide price of intangibles. In-
dustry adjustment ensures that the measure is not simply a sort on industry. For
example, sorting stocks according to their M/B ratio is correlated with sorting on
industry as firms in industries such as technology will have relatively high M/B ra-
tios on average, while firms in industries like utilities will have relatively low M/B
ratios on average. Measures of relative misvaluation, such as the industry-adjusted
M/B, capture deviations in firm valuations from the average valuations of their in-
dustry peers. Thus, relatively overvalued utilities and technology firms alike have
high MBE-IA measures, while relatively undervalued utilities and technology firms
have low MBE − IA measures.4
In this dissertation, the primary measure for the direction of arbitrage trades is
residual firm value (RFV ) estimated using the market-to-book equity decomposi-
3In this dissertation, mispricing represents the difference between market price and unobserved
fundamental value, while relative misvaluation represents the difference between market price and
predicted fundamental value. Relative misvaluation thus reflects either mispricing or cross-sectional
differences in expected returns due to time-varying or omitted risk factors.
4An alternative measure of relative misvaluation is industry-adjusted market-to-book value of assets
(MBA-IA) which represents the difference between the market price of a dollar of firm assets from
the industry average. Other measures, with similar interpretations, include the industry-adjusted
price-to-earnings and price-to-sales ratios.
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tion developed in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005, RKRV).5 I use
RKRV’s regression-based methodology as it provides the flexibility to control for
cross-sectional differences in book equity, net income, and leverage (cost of equity)
at the same time.6 RKRV’s approach decomposes market value into predicted and
residual value components where the residual value is net of industry-average intan-
gible values. This approach allows regression slopes to vary across industries and
across time.7
Residual firm value is computed as the difference between a security’s market price
and its predicted intrinsic value where unobserved intrinsic value is estimated using
publicly available accounting information. Following RKRV’s approach, I estimate
RFV using within-industry, cross-sectional valuation regressions where industry is
defined using the Fama and French 12 industry classification. The coefficient esti-
mates are used to compute predicted intrinsic value and residual firm value. While
RKRV use annual regressions, I am interested in linking this measure, as a proxy
for the direction of arbitrage trades, with monthly momentum trades. Changes in
RFV across time capture not only changes in a firm’s market value in terms of its
observable accounting information, but more importantly, it captures the changing
dynamics of the industry through changes in coefficient estimates. Thus firm pre-
dicted values change monthly due to changes in industry composition (firms enter
and exit), changes in accounting variables, and changes in factor loadings on the ac-
counting variables. The latter component captures the changes in the firm’s market
value relative to changes in valuation for the rest of the industry. This is arguably
5The results in this paper are not reliant upon a specific measure of relative misvaluation but are
robust to using alternative industry-adjusted measures such as M/B, MVA/BV A, or P/E.
6An important aspect of relative misvaluation is that omitted risk factors or time-varying risk
premia are not directly observable. RFV is based on industry-relative valuation and and as such
should reasonably reflect the relative within-industry ranking of misvaluation attributed to the
stock by arbitrageurs and relative value traders.
7Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009) demonstrate the importance of considering the industry
component in the cross-section of stock returns.
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the most important component, as the measure is used as a proxy for the valuation
of a firm relative to its peers.
Empirically, RKRV’s general approach is to decompose each stock’s log market-
to-book ratio into an unobserved intrinsic value-to-book ratio plus a pricing error as
follows:
m− b = (m− iv) + (iv − b) (2.1)
where m is the log market value, b is the log book value, and iv is the log intrinsic
value. Thus the market-to-book ratio is decomposed into pricing error (m− iv) and
intrinsic value-to-book (iv − b) ratio.
Intrinsic value is unobservable so it is estimated using monthly within-industry
valuation regressions.8 Residual firm value (RFV ) is computed as the difference
between the natural log of market value and predicted intrinsic value. As mentioned
earlier, the regression framework allows the estimated slopes to vary across industries
and across time. The valuation model is specified as:
meit = α0jt + α1jtbeit + α2jtni
+
it + α3jtI(NI<0)ni
+
it + α4jtLEVit + it (2.2)
where meit is log market equity, beit is log book equity, ni
+
it is log absolute value of
net income, and LEVit is book leverage. The net income component is estimated in
two parts to separate the effects of firms with negative net income. The second term
interacts ni+it with an indicator variable that is equal to one if net income is negative
8RKRV motivate their valuation model as a decomposition of firm market value into book value
plus residual income where residual income is defined as the difference between the ROEt and the
firm’s cost of capital rt:
Mt = Bt + Et
∞∑
τ=t+1
(ROEτ − rτ )Bτ−1
(1 + rτ )τ
RKRV justify regressing log market value on log book value with two identifying restrictions: a)
future return on equity is a constant multiple of expected future discount rates and b) book equity
is expected to grow at a constant rate. The inclusion of net income is justified by assuming that
book value and net income are growing at constant rates. Leverage is included in the model to
allow the cost of capital to vary across firms with book leverage different from the industry average.
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and zero otherwise. RFV is computed as the difference between log market equity
and predicted intrinsic value (i.e. estimated residual):
RFV = meit − αˆ0jt − αˆ1jtbeit − αˆ2jtni+it − αˆ3jtI(<0)ni+it − αˆ4jtLEVit (2.3)
RFV is mean zero monthly within each industry since it is estimated using
monthly, within industry, cross-sectional regressions. As implemented, this approach
captures deviation in firm values from industry average valuations. RFV is positive
when firms are overvalued relative to their industry peers, and negative when firms
are undervalued relative to their peers.
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3. MOMENTUM, ARBITRAGE, AND FUTURE STOCK RETURNS
In this section I provide analyses that support using residual firm value (RFV ) as
a proxy for the direction of trade of the average arbitrageur. Mispricing is unobserv-
able and thus arbitrageurs must rely on measures of relative misvaluation estimated
using observable information as proxies for mispricing. As noted earlier, the differ-
ence between a firm’s valuation and the valuations of its peer firms can be due to
either mispricing or omitted risk factors. By basing trades on measures of relative
misvaluation such as RFV , arbitrage or relative value trading will help to correct
mispricing in the subset of stocks where this deviation is due to mispricing. Further,
arbitrageurs profit on average from the correction of mispricing and/or from earned
risk premia making the distinction between mispricing and risk less important. For
example, the expected return to a fairly priced stock i can be represented as follows:
E[ri − rf ] = E[βiλ+ i] = E[βiλ] (3.1)
where rf is the risk-free rate, β is a vector of stock i ’s risk exposure to benchmark
risk factors, λ is a vector of risk premia, and  is random noise. Under the assumption
that the market price equals fundamental value and the benchmark risk factors are
the appropriate set of risk factors, the expected return to the investor is compensation
for exposure to the benchmark risk factors.
However, when stocks are relatively misvalued, arbitrageurs or relative value
traders earn an α due to the correction of mispricing and/or the exposure to omitted
risk factors.1 To see this, note that the expected return to relatively misvalued stock
i can be written as:
E[ri − rf ] = E[βiλ+Mi + β′iλ′] = E[βiλ+ αi] (3.2)
1For simplicity in this example, I assume that there is no estimation error in the benchmark factors
(e.g. (βλ− βˆλˆ) = 0).
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where β′ is a vector of omitted risk factors, λ′ is a vector of the corresponding risk
premia, and Mi is the return due to the change in the level of mispricing. Mi will
be positive (negative) on average when there is a reduction (increase) in the level
of mispricing. Because mispricing and omitted risk factors are unobservable, the
observed α captures the benchmark risk-adjusted return to the arbitrageur as shown
in Equation 3.2.
Even though mispricing is unobservable, arbitrageurs earn a benchmark adjusted
profit (on average) from the earned risk premia and/or the correction in mispricing
when stocks are misvalued relative to their peers. Thus it seems reasonable that
the trades of arbitrageurs are correlated with a trading strategy based on RFV
which generates a positive return to buying relatively undervalued stocks and selling
relatively overvalued stocks. It is this relative value trading that can be disrupted
when a subset of traders, such as momentum traders, do not condition on relative
value and thus may push prices away from fundamental value. Detailed portfolio
and regression analyses in this section show that RFV predicts returns in the cross-
section of stocks. These results are robust to risk adjustment and persistent across
sub-periods. As such, RFV appears to be a reasonable proxy for the direction of
trade for the average arbitrageur.
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Monthly stock data including price, return, trading volume, and shares outstand-
ing are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (”CRSP”) database
for all common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock exchanges
between 1963 and 2010. Annual accounting data including book equity, net income,
and total assets are obtained from Standard & Poor’s Investment Services’ Compu-
stat North America (”COMPUSTAT”) database for the period 1962 to 2009. The
data sample excludes stocks with share prices below $5.
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To ensure the accounting information is known at the time market equity value
is computed, I match CRSP and COMPUSTAT records using the approach docu-
mented in Fama and French (1992). Annual accounting data for all firms with fiscal
years ending in calendar year t − 1 are matched with price information for the 12
months from July at time t to June at time t + 1.2 To be included in the sample,
firms are required to have valid prices at December of year t− 1 and June of year t
and must have at least 2 years of prior history in the COMPUSTAT database. To
avoid selection bias, accounting variables prior to 1962 are excluded from the sample.
From this data sample, I retain observations with non-missing values for the
variables which are required to estimate residual firm value. RFV is estimated
as the residual from monthly, within-industry, cross-sectional regressions following
the specification in equation 2.2. Market equity (ME) is computed monthly as
the product of price and the number of shares outstanding (in millions). Book
equity (BE) is computed as total common equity (item ceq) plus deferred taxes
(item txditc). If total common equity is missing, BE is set to missing for that year.
Net Income (NI) is selected directly from COMPUSTAT (item ni). Book Leverage
(BLEV ) is computed as one minus book equity divided by book value of total assets
(1 − BE/TA). To ensure the estimates of RFV are not influenced by extremely
illiquid stocks, stocks are required to have strictly positive trading volume and a
valid measure of Amihud’s (2002) measure of illiquidity. Stocks are also required to
have non-missing monthly returns over the prior 12 months. Similar to RKRV, firms
with market equity below $10 million are also excluded. All tables are based on the
period 1967 to 2010 as some industries do not have sufficient observations to reliably
estimate residual firm value over the 1963 to 1966 period. To minimize the influence
of extreme values, scaled variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
2The Fama and French (1992) approach is used to ensure that arbitrageurs are able to observe the
accounting data at the time of trade. The use of quarterly accounting data and/or more timely
matching of market equity provides similar results.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics (1967-2010)
This table presents time-series averages of monthly cross-sectional summary statistics for various
stock characteristics. The sample consists of common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
from January 1967 to December 2010. Additional details regarding the data sample and key
variables are contained in Section 3.1. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the key variables.
Panel B reports time-series averages of monthly pairwise cross-sectional correlations. Panel C
reports descriptive statistics for firms within each of the Fama and French 12 industry classifications.
MBE is the market to book equity ratio. MBE-IA is the industry-adjusted market to book equity
ratio where industry is defined using 2-digit SIC codes. MBA-IA is the industry-adjusted market
to book assets ratio where industry is defined using 2-digit SIC codes. RFV is residual firm
value estimated using cross-sectional valuation regressions within each of the Fama and French 12
industry classifications detailed in Section 3.3. ME is market value of equity, BE is book value of
equity, NI is net income, BLEV is book leverage, RET1M is the past one-month return (includes
delisting return), and RET6M is the past 6-month return. Dollar values are in millions. Ratios
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable MEAN MED STD MIN MAX P1 P25 P75 P99
MBE 2.631 1.665 3.03 0.33 23.06 0.38 1.09 2.86 17.36
MBE-IA -0.052 -0.258 0.79 -0.92 4.19 -0.87 -0.53 0.13 3.75
MBA-IA -0.022 -0.127 0.57 -0.75 2.95 -0.68 -0.35 0.07 2.60
RFV 0.000 -0.024 0.60 -2.43 2.90 -1.41 -0.37 0.33 1.64
ME 1856 279 7370 9 158180 15 91 1005 30918
BE 842 151 3127 1 66183 5 52 510 11872
NI 92 13 508 -7573 10307 -193 3 54 1708
BLEV 0.519 0.511 0.22 0.09 0.95 0.09 0.36 0.67 0.95
RET1M 0.012 0.006 0.11 -0.50 0.91 -0.24 -0.05 0.06 0.33
RET6M 0.102 0.059 0.32 -0.67 4.44 -0.43 -0.08 0.22 1.18
Panel B: Pearson Correlations
MBE MBE-IA MBA-IA RFV ME BE NI BLEV RET1M
MBE-IA 0.83
MBA-IA 0.76 0.86
RFV 0.64 0.67 0.64
ME 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.16
BE -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.80
NI 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.80 0.79
BLEV -0.06 0.05 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02
RET1M 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RET6M 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.39
Panel C: Industry Statistics (Fama and French 12 groups)
FF12IND CNDUR CDUR MANU ENER CHEM COMP TELTV UTIL WHOL MED FIN OTHER
Count 170 75 348 85 71 295 47 142 236 151 358 253
Min 78 26 113 17 33 20 13 93 36 16 21 55
Max 243 125 506 134 96 670 85 191 383 334 761 420
ME 2050 1216 1302 3969 2786 2039 5315 1796 1466 2442 1590 1291
BE 655 811 551 2277 947 549 3666 1536 513 550 904 712
NI 105 81 65 277 139 65 204 119 66 90 104 53
BLEV 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.40 0.55 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.80 0.51
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Table 3.1, Panel A presents time-series averages of cross-sectional descriptive
statistics of the data sample for the period 1967 to 2010. The data sample represents
1,178,575 observations and 11,997 unique securities. Residual Firm Value, RFV , the
primary measure of relative misvaluation, is mean zero since it is estimated as the
residual from within-industry valuation regressions. The sample exhibits variation in
measures of relative value such as the market-to-book equity ratio (MBE), as well
as measures of relative misvaluation such as RFV , the industry-adjusted market-
to-book equity ratio (MBE-IA), and the market-to-book assets ratio (MBA-IA).
Market equity, book equity, and net income are skewed and thus log values will be
used in the valuation regressions.
Table 3.1, Panel B presents the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for the
data sample. RFV is positively correlated with other measures of relative misvalu-
ation, such as MBE-IA (0.67) and MBA-IA (0.64). ME is highly correlated with
both BE and NI. The correlation between BE and NI is also high at 0.79, but
does not influence the estimation of RFV .3
Table 3.1, Panel C presents average firm counts and summary statistics for each
of the 12 industry groups for the sample period 1967 to 2010. Minimum firm-month
counts are important as RFV is estimated using within-industry cross-sectional re-
gressions. Only three of the industries have minimum industry-month firm counts
below 20 observations. There are 48 industry-month combinations with 20 or fewer
firm observations in the data sample. Each of these 48 industry-month combina-
tions occur prior to 1970. Sub-period analysis in later tables demonstrates that the
industry-month combinations with less than 20 firms do not materially affect the re-
sults. In untabulated results, I find substantial variation across industries for a wide
3In untabulated results NI+ is replaced with NI/BE+ in the valuation regressions to see if the
high correlation of net income and book equity variables affects the results. The adjusted R-square
values are almost identical to those in the above specification and there is not a significant change
in the ranking of firms according to relative misvaluation. Further, analysis in later tables using
RFV based on the model with NI+ is quantitatively similar to the model with NI/BE+. I thus
continue with RKRV’s specification for the remainder of the paper.
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range of accounting-based measures such as price-to-earnings multiple (12.9 to 22.5),
book leverage (0.38 to 0.80), asset growth (0.095 to 0.244), and cash flow growth
(-0.019 to 0.149) providing support for performing valuation regressions within each
of the industry groups.
Fig. 3.1. Residual Firm Value (Jan. 1967 to Dec. 2010)
This figure shows monthly estimates of residual firm value (RFV) for the period 1967 to 2010.
RFV is the residual from monthly within-industry, cross-sectional regressions where the de-
pendent variable is log market equity and the independent variables are log book equity, log
absolute value of net income, a negative net income indicator interacted with log absolute value
of net income, and book leverage. Each month, firms are sorted into deciles based on RFV.
The equal-weighted average RFV is calculated monthly for each decile portfolio and displayed
in this figure.
Figure 3.1 presents the time series of monthly average RFV for the firms within
each RFV decile. Decile 9 represents firms that are most undervalued (negative
RFV ) and decile 0 represents firms that are most overvalued. Firms are sorted
in this manner as relatively undervalued firms are expected to have higher average
returns than relatively overvalued firms, all else equal. By definition average monthly
RFV equals zero for each industry. The spread in average RFV between the lowest
and highest deciles demonstrates significant variation across time.
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3.2 Portfolio Results
RFV Portfolios. The first empirical tests investigate whether RFV predicts returns
in the cross-section of stock returns. If RFV captures security mispricing and/or
cross-sectional differences in expected returns, then relatively undervalued stocks
should have higher average returns than relatively overvalued stocks. RFV portfo-
lios are formed by sorting stocks into decile portfolios according to RFV estimated
during month t− 2. The decile rankings are reversed so that relatively undervalued
stocks (lowest RFV ) are placed in decile 9 and relatively overvalued stocks (highest
RFV ) are placed in decile 0. Portfolios are held for one month at time t. One
month is skipped between the measurement period and holding period to minimize
microstructure issues.
Table 3.2 confirms that RFV has predictive power in the cross-section of stocks.
Panel A shows that average time t returns are increasing across RFV deciles. Rel-
atively undervalued stocks (decile 9) have average future returns that are approxi-
mately 48 basis points (t-statistic = 2.47) per month higher than returns to relatively
overvalued stocks (decile 0) over the period 1967 to 2010. Table 3.2, Panel B shows
that market model alphas average 0.56 basis points (t-statistic = 2.87).4 These
results suggest that RFV is a reasonable proxy for the direction of arbitrage trades.
As discussed earlier, Figure 3.1 shows that the difference in RFV between rel-
atively undervalued and relatively overvalued stocks exhibits substantial variation
across time. Intuitively this makes sense as relative misvaluation, whether driven by
mispricing or cross-sectional differences in expected returns, is likely to vary across
time with changes in the business cycle or time-varying limits-to-arbitrage. Cooper,
4In untabulated results, (similar to Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)) I find that
intrinsic value-to-book (V alue/Book) estimated from the market-to-book decomposition (e.g. val-
uation regressions) does not predict returns in the cross-section of stocks. The difference in average
returns between high and low V alue/Book decile portfolios is approximately 28 basis points per
month (t-statistic = 1.35) over the period 1967 to 2010. Consistent with Daniel and Titman (2006)
these results suggest that RFV isolates the common, intangible components of MBE, MBE-IA,
and MBA-IA that are responsible for the ability to predict returns in the cross-section of stocks.
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Table 3.2
Relative Misvaluation Portfolio Returns (1967-2010)
This table presents time series average returns (in % form) to portfolios formed on a proxy of relative
misvaluation for the period 1967 to 2010 and indicated sub-periods. Residual firm value (”RFV ”),
the proxy for relative misvaluation, is computed as the residual from within-industry cross sectional
valuation regressions. The construction of RFV is detailed in Section 2.3. Panel A reports the
one-month (time=t) holding period returns to portfolios formed by sorting stocks into deciles each
month according to relative misvaluation estimated at time t−2. One-month is skipped between the
measurement period and calculation of holding period returns to minimize microstructure issues.
Portfolios are sorted such that stocks in portfolio 9 are the most undervalued (RFV is lowest) while
the firms in portfolio 0 are the most overvalued (RFV is highest). Panel B reports alphas computed
using the market model for the portfolios in Panel A. Panel C reports the returns to the relative
misvaluation portfolios when the cumulative market return over the most recent 36 month period
is greater than or equal to zero (Up) and when the cumulative market return is negative (Down).
T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates are based on Newey-West standard errors.
Portfolio Decile
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9-0
Panel A: Average Returns (%) to Relative Misvaluation Portfolios
RFV 0.87 1.02 1.01 1.12 1.11 1.23 1.32 1.36 1.33 1.35 0.48
2.93 3.93 4.18 4.84 4.82 5.32 5.40 5.39 4.80 4.39 2.47
Panel B: Market Model Alphas (%) to Relative Misvaluation Portfolios
RFV -0.18 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.22 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.38 0.56
-1.49 0.35 0.54 1.80 1.92 2.76 2.96 3.14 2.54 2.07 2.87
Panel C: Average Returns (%) following Up and Down Markets
RFV Up 0.81 0.94 0.91 1.02 1.01 1.11 1.19 1.21 1.17 1.13 0.32
2.66 3.63 3.81 4.39 4.59 4.90 5.00 4.87 4.35 3.81 1.56
Down 1.14 1.44 1.47 1.62 1.60 1.84 1.99 2.10 2.13 2.44 1.30
1.46 1.90 2.14 2.49 2.21 2.68 2.78 2.84 2.52 2.64 3.08
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Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004, ”CGH”) show that on average momentum strate-
gies are profitable (not profitable) when the most recent 36-month market return is
non-negative (negative). They argue that mispricing is correlated with the market
state.
Table 3.2, Panel C demonstrates time-variation in misvaluation as returns to a
long-short RFV hedge portfolio (9-0) are higher in periods when the most recent
36-month market return is negative (”Down”) (1.30% per month, t-statistic=3.08)
than in periods when the most recent 36-month market return is non-negative (”Up”)
(0.32%, t-statistic=1.56). This finding is consistent with the suggested interaction of
momentum traders and arbitrageurs. All else equal, I expect arbitrage strategies to
be less profitable when arbitrageurs reduce arbitrage intensity in response to observ-
ing past returns that suggest momentum traders will continue to push prices away
from fundamental value. Likewise, it seems reasonable that the intensity of momen-
tum trades will decrease during periods when momentum trading is unprofitable (e.g.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)) and the intensity and effectiveness of arbitrageur capital
will increase as a result.
Momentum and RFV Portfolios. I next examine the interaction of relative misval-
uation and momentum strategy returns. Portfolio sorts on past returns (deciles)
followed by dependent sorts on RFV (terciles) demonstrate that relatively under-
valued stocks produce significantly higher returns than relatively overvalued stocks
in each of the momentum deciles over the period 1967 to 2010. Table 3.3, Panel
A presents average returns to momentum portfolios conditioned on RFV . Firms
in RFV 3 are relatively undervalued and RFV 1 are relatively overvalued. Returns
to RFV spread portfolios (relatively undervalued stocks minus relatively overvalued
stocks) are positive and significant within each momentum decile with average re-
turns of 0.25 to 0.71% per month (t-statistics range from 1.77 to 4.53) with stronger
results in the past winners decile. Thus RFV appears to be a reasonable proxy for
the direction of arbitrage trade across each momentum decile.
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Table 3.3
Momentum and Relative Misvaluation Portfolios (1967-2010)
This table presents time series average returns (in % form) to portfolios formed on past returns and
relative misvaluation for the period 1967 to 2010 (Panel A) and the sub-period 1993 to 2010 (Panel
B). Portfolios are formed monthly by first sorting stocks into decile portfolios according to past
6 month returns. Firms are then placed (dependent sort) into three relative misvaluation tercile
portfolios based on residual firm value (RFV ). The construction of RFV is detailed in Section
2.3. RFV 1 portfolios contain firms with RFV values in the highest tercile (relatively overvalued)
and RFV 3 contains firms with RFV values in the lowest tercile (relatively undervalued). One-
month holding period returns are calculated for each portfolio. One month is skipped between
measurement of sorting variables and computing holding period returns to minimize microstructure
issues. T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates are based on Newey-West standard errors.
Momentum Decile 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 9-0
Panel A: Average returns (%) for portfolios sorted on MOM (deciles) then RFV (terciles)
RFV 1 0.31 0.72 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 1.17 1.35 1.05
0.87 2.48 3.71 3.72 4.10 4.07 4.20 3.90 4.26 3.94 4.40
RFV 2 0.71 1.13 1.22 1.15 1.27 1.21 1.09 1.15 1.21 1.75 1.04
2.16 3.96 4.94 4.80 5.92 5.84 5.14 4.93 4.76 5.51 4.07
RFV 3 0.56 1.15 1.31 1.26 1.35 1.51 1.45 1.58 1.69 2.06 1.50
1.63 3.72 4.76 4.68 5.25 6.04 5.65 6.19 5.95 6.20 5.84
RFV 3−RFV 1 0.25 0.43 0.36 0.33 0.40 0.54 0.47 0.62 0.52 0.71 0.45
1.77 3.69 3.00 2.88 3.26 4.39 3.81 4.53 3.45 3.92 2.40
Panel B: Average returns (%) for 1993 to 2010 Sub-Period
RFV 1 0.35 0.59 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.74 0.99 1.16 0.81
0.65 1.39 1.95 2.39 2.63 2.59 2.70 2.20 2.53 2.15 1.94
RFV 2 0.70 0.91 1.11 0.92 1.08 1.02 1.03 1.13 1.08 1.79 1.09
1.40 2.24 3.00 2.66 3.51 3.27 3.25 3.49 2.93 3.54 2.23
RFV 3 0.52 0.99 1.20 1.10 1.08 1.25 1.23 1.46 1.60 2.25 1.73
0.90 2.16 2.81 2.72 2.69 3.34 3.17 3.70 3.72 3.98 3.37
RFV 3−RFV 1 0.17 0.40 0.45 0.28 0.26 0.41 0.39 0.73 0.61 1.10 0.92
0.68 2.15 2.41 1.55 1.35 2.48 2.00 3.50 2.73 3.33 2.93
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Average returns to long-short momentum portfolios are positive and significant
across RFV portfolios. For relatively overvalued firms (RFV 1), the average return
to a long-short momentum portfolio is 1.05% (t-statistic=4.40) per month while the
average return to relatively undervalued firms (RFV 3) is 1.50% (t-statistic=5.84).
The momentum strategy constructed using relatively undervalued firms outperforms
the strategy using relatively overvalued firms by approximately 45 basis points per
month. As momentum is profitable in both strategies it seems reasonable that some
momentum traders may trade unconditionally with respect to relative valuation of
the underlying stocks.
Table 3.3, Panel B presents average returns to momentum portfolios conditioned
on RFV for the 1993 to 2010 sub-period. Similar to the full-period sample, the
RFV spread portfolio is positive within each momentum decile (significant in 7 of
the 10 deciles) with larger differences in the past winners momentum deciles. The
highly significant differences in spreads between relatively undervalued and relatively
overvalued past winner portfolios is consistent with relative misvaluation being an
important dimension of the profitability of the momentum strategy. Summarizing
the portfolio sorts, I find that relatively undervalued firms have higher future returns
than overvalued firms, especially for past winners. As such, it seems reasonable that
RFV proxies for the direction of arbitrage trades.
Figure 3.2 shows that there is substantial variation in RFV within momentum
stocks classified as past winners (Panel A) and past losers (Panel B). The graphed
lines represent average RFV for tercile portfolios formed monthly by sorting stocks
on RFV within each momentum decile. The graph suggests that at least one-third
of the stocks in each of the past winners and past losers deciles are overvalued
(RFV > 0)) and one-third are undervalued (RFV < 0). This is consistent with
Fama’s (1998) assertion that in an efficient market one expects to observe under-
reaction and overreaction with similar frequencies. The magnitude of misvaluation
appears to be stronger in the overvalued winner and undervalued loser portfolios.
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Fig. 3.2. Residual Firm Value of Winners and Losers (Jan. 1967 to Dec. 2010)
This figure shows monthly estimates of residual firm value (RFV) for the period 1967 to 2010
for stocks that are recent winners (Panel A) and recent losers (Panel B). RFV is the residual
from monthly within-industry, cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable is log
market equity and the independent variables are log book equity, log absolute value of net
income, a negative net income indicator interacted with log absolute value of net income, and
book leverage. Each month, firms are sorted into deciles based on RFV. The equal-weighted
average RFV is calculated monthly for each decile portfolio and displayed in this figure.
This is consistent with more mispricing as arbitrageurs reduce arbitrage intensity
when they expect momentum traders to purchase overvalued winners and sell un-
dervalued losers, pushing prices away from fundamental value.
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3.3 Regression Results
In this section I follow Fama-MacBeth (1973, FMB) and estimate FMB re-
gressions using individual stocks. Regression analysis allows the estimation of the
marginal effects of residual firm value after controlling for a wide range of stock char-
acteristics. Based on the discussions above, I expect to find a negative and significant
relationship between RFV and future returns. If RFV proxies for the direction of
arbitrageur trades, then the relationship between RFV and future returns should not
be subsumed by cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics and other control
variables.
The dependent variable in the FMB regressions is time t excess stock returns.
Independent variables are measured at time t − 2. One month is skipped between
measurement of the dependent and independent variables to minimize microstruc-
ture issues. Control variables motivated by Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(1998) include book-to-market (B/M), market equity (SIZE), turnover (TURN), and
one-month past returns (RET1M, measured at t-2), and past returns (RET212M,
measured over t-3 to t-13).5 Based on the findings of Amihud (2002), I control for
illiquidity (ILLIQ). I also control for idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) as suggested by
Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006).
Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and Kalcheva (2010, ABK) show that microstruc-
ture noise can result in an upward biased estimate of return premia when illiquid
stocks are included in the sample. They suggest that using realized returns as a
dependent variable and firm measures correlated with microstructure noise as inde-
pendent variables may lead to upward biased estimates. Since RFV is computed as
the residual obtained by regressing market value on accounting variables, it seems
5Atkins and Dyl (1997) provide evidence that NASDAQ stock volumes are overstated due to inter-
dealer trading. In untabulated results I run two tests to ensure that the results are not due to
improper measurement of TURN. First, I exclude NASDAQ stocks from the FMB regressions.
Next, following Avramov and Chordia (2006) I separate NASDAQ volume from NYSE and AMEX
volume and include a NASDAQ dummy. In both cases I do not find a material change in the
coefficient estimates on RFV .
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reasonable to expect that RFV may be correlated with microstructure noise. I ad-
dress this risk of microstructure noise in the regression analysis by skipping one
month between the dependent and independent variables. In untabulated results, I
also follow the suggestions of ABK and use weighted least squares (WLS) where the
weight is set equal to one plus the prior month’s gross return. There are no material
differences in the results obtained using WLS so I report the OLS results in Table
3.4.
Table 3.4, Panel A shows the results from FMB regressions using individual
stocks where the dependent variable is the excess stock return (in excess of the risk-
free rate). The independent variables are residual firm value (RFV ) and the control
variables discussed above. The first column shows the coefficient estimates using all
stocks and the control variables. As documented in the literature, I find a positive
and significant relationship between future returns and the book-to-market ratio,
past returns, and illiquidity. While the literature has documented a negative and
significant relationship between future returns and firm size, the coefficient estimate
in this regression is positive and insignificant. This is due to the high correlation
between firm size and illiquidity. When illiquidity is excluded as a control, the
coefficient estimate on firm size is negative and highly significant. The first column
also shows that the coefficient estimate on idiosyncratic volatility is negative and
highly significant.
In the second column, I include RFV in the regression using all stocks in the data
sample. Similar to the results of the portfolio sorts, there is a significant negative re-
lationship between future returns and residual firm value with a coefficient estimate
of -0.30% (t-statistic=-4.70) for the period 1967-2010. Relatively undervalued firms
have higher average returns than relatively overvalued firms, all else equal. The only
significant change in the control variables is the loading on the book-to-market vari-
able which is not statistically significant in this regression. Fama and French (1992)
and many others have demonstrated the cross-sectional predictability of the book-
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Table 3.4
Fama-MacBeth Regressions using Individual Stocks (1967-2010)
This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth (FMB) regressions where the dependent variable is excess returns to
individual stocks and the independent variables are residual firm value, RFV , and stock characteristics. One-month
is skipped between measurement of the dependent (t) and independent (t− 2) variables to minimize microstructure
effects. The construction of RFV is detailed in Section 2.3. The control variables are defined in Section 3.3. Individual
stocks are sorted into momentum quintile groups based on their prior six month compound return (MOM5 represents
past winners, MOM1 represents past losers). Each panel reports results for the full-sample as well as each of the
momentum quintile groups. Panel A reports FMB coefficient estimates for the sample period 1967 to 2010. Panel
B reports FMB coefficient estimates over the 1967 to 1992 and 1993 to 2010 sub-periods. Panel C reports FMB
coefficient estimates in periods following Up markets (prior 36-month market return is greater than or equal to zero)
and Down markets. Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100. T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates are
based on Newey-West standard errors.
Panel A: FMB coefficient estimates (1967-2010)
All Firms MOM1 MOM2 MOM3 MOM4 MOM5
RFV -0.30 -0.22 -0.20 -0.36 -0.41 -0.45
-4.70 -2.33 -2.39 -4.13 -4.54 -4.69
ln(B/M) 0.21 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.03 -0.03 -0.08
2.89 0.60 1.61 1.77 0.29 -0.29 -0.71
ln(SIZE) 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.00
1.28 1.66 2.66 0.40 1.64 -0.28 0.01
ln(ILLIQ) 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.20
3.78 3.79 2.61 1.09 3.39 1.70 2.47
ln(TURN) 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.01
1.41 1.42 0.83 0.53 1.50 -0.03 0.13
RET1M 1.19 1.13 -0.47 -0.22 0.80 1.28 1.84
3.69 3.32 -1.00 -0.43 1.52 2.28 4.51
RET2− 12M 0.79 0.80 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.99 0.66
5.21 5.07 3.47 2.90 3.83 4.38 4.98
IV OL -27.13 -27.11 -36.35 -25.12 -28.58 -11.46 -24.46
-7.19 -7.12 -8.32 -4.64 -5.36 -1.99 -4.39
Intercept 1.54 1.34 0.46 1.27 1.41 1.25 1.70
3.21 2.85 0.87 2.55 2.98 2.60 3.18
Adj.−R2 5.84 6.00 5.27 5.92 6.30 6.39 5.45
Panel B: FMB coefficient estimates in indicated sub-periods
All Firms MOM1 MOM2 MOM3 MOM4 MOM5
1967-1992 -0.34 -0.23 -0.25 -0.44 -0.47 -0.44
-4.74 -1.75 -2.24 -4.21 -3.86 -3.82
1993-2010 -0.23 -0.21 -0.13 -0.24 -0.33 -0.47
-2.08 -1.57 -1.00 -1.69 -2.47 -2.81
Panel C: FMB coefficient estimates following up and down markets
All Firms MOM1 MOM2 MOM3 MOM4 MOM5
Mkt− Up -0.29 -0.19 -0.21 -0.35 -0.38 -0.48
-4.11 -1.91 -2.24 -3.44 -3.73 -4.50
Mkt−Down -0.34 -0.40 -0.15 -0.40 -0.55 -0.29
-2.37 -1.31 -0.87 -2.65 -2.28 -1.54
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to-market ratio. Since RFV is estimated using a market-to-book decomposition, I
infer that RFV contains the information in the book-to-market ratio that predicts
returns in the cross-section. These results support the findings of Daniel and Titman
(2006), who show that return predictability is related to intangible information con-
tained in the book-to-market ratio, as captured by RFV , and not related to tangible
accounting information.
Table 3.4, Panel A also reports results in which firms are sorted into quintile
portfolios based on past returns measured over time t-7 to t-2 (denoted MOM1 to
MOM5, MOM5 represents past winners). FMB regressions using individual stocks
are estimated within each of the momentum quintile portfolios. The coefficient es-
timates on RFV are negative and significant in each of the momentum quintiles,
but are stronger in the past winners quintile (-0.45%, t-statistic=-4.69). While still
negative and significant, the coefficient estimate in past losers (MOM1) quintile (-
0.22%,t-statistic=-2.33) is approximately one-half the size of the past winners quin-
tile.
Table 3.4, Panel B shows that the coefficient estimates on RFV are significant
in both the 1967 to 1992 (-0.34%, t-statistic=-4.74) and 1993 to 2010 (-0.23%, t-
statistic=-2.08) sub-periods. The results are highly significant in the past winners
deciles in both sub-periods. Similar to the full-period results, the coefficient estimates
on RFV in the past losers quintile is roughly one-half the size of the coefficient
estimates in the past winners quintile. Table 3.4, Panel C shows that the results
are also significant in periods following up markets (-0.29%, t-statistic=-4.11) and in
periods following down markets (-0.34%, t-statistic=-2.37). The results are strongest
in the past winners quintile following Up markets and in the MOM4 quintile following
down markets.
Overall, RFV appears to be a reasonable proxy for the direction of arbitrage
trades. Consistent with the portfolio analysis section, future returns are negative
and significantly related to RFV . Relatively undervalued stocks have significantly
31
higher returns than overvalued stocks. This relationship is robust to a full set of
controls for firm characteristics, and is robust to regressions within sub-periods and
market states. Similar to the portfolio analysis section, the relationship between
future returns and RFV is strongest in the past winners momentum quintile.
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4. CONDITIONAL MOMENTUM STRATEGIES
4.1 Methodology
In this section I use the interaction of momentum traders and arbitrageurs to mo-
tivate the construction of two conditional momentum strategies for empirical tests.
Given the results of the portfolio analyses (Tables 3.2 and 3.3) and regression anal-
yses (Table 3.4), it appears that there is a significant difference between the average
returns of stocks that are relatively undervalued and those that are relatively over-
valued, especially among past winners. Momentum strategies conditioned on the
direction of arbitrage trades should result in at least partial separation of the effects
of mispricing. Empirical tests using these conditional strategies should provide new
insights into whether momentum is the result of behavioral or rational processes.
The return series to the unconditional momentum strategy, MOM , is computed
each month by sorting firms into decile portfolios based on prior six month compound
returns (t − 7 to t − 2) and then holding the portfolio for six months (t to t + 5).
The monthly returns are computed as an equal-weighted average of the returns to
the six overlapping portfolios (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Liu and Zhang
(2008)). One month is skipped between the measurement period and holding period
to minimize microstructure effects. To demonstrate that the results in this section are
not due to compound sorting on past returns, I construct an extreme unconditional
momentum strategy (XMOM) using thirty groups (instead of deciles) when forming
portfolios.1 The XMOM strategy is thus constructed so that the long and short
portfolios contain a similar number of firms as the conditional momentum strategies.
The interaction of arbitrageurs and momentum traders suggests that a conditional
momentum strategy composed of stocks where momentum trades are in the same
1Bandarchuk and Hilscher (2012) show that sorting on firm characteristics such as size, turnover,
price, credit risk, market-to-book, and illiquidity and then on past returns generates conditional
momentum strategies that have more extreme past returns since the characteristics are correlated
with past returns.
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direction as arbitrage trades should contain relatively less mispricing than a strategy
formed using stocks where momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrage
trades. I construct the two conditional momentum strategies by sorting firms first
into momentum deciles based on prior six month returns (t − 7 to t − 2) and then
into RFV terciles as a proxy for the direction of arbitrage trades.2 AMOM is an
arbitrage-reinforcing strategy that is long undervalued past winners (i.e. Table 3.3,
RFV 3, MOM9) and short overvalued past losers (RFV 1, MOM0). NMOM is an
arbitrage-impeding strategy that is long overvalued past winners (RFV 1, MOM9)
and short undervalued past losers (RFV 3, MOM0). I also construct a difference
strategy, N -A, by subtracting the monthly AMOM returns from NMOM returns.
While both AMOM and NMOM may be related to omitted or time-varying risk, the
interaction of arbitrageurs and momentum traders suggests that NMOM contains
relatively more mispricing than AMOM .3 Thus, N -A is designed to highlight the
influence of mispricing on the unconditional momentum strategy.
Table 4.1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the momentum strategy, ex-
treme momentum strategy, conditional momentum strategies, the risk factors from
the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model, and an Amihud (2002) illiquidity risk
factor (”AMILS”). The mean return to the MOM strategy over the 1967 to 2010
period was 1.13% per month. The momentum strategy is clearly risky with a min-
imum monthly return of -25.9% and a maximum monthly return of 31.1% over the
1967 to 2010 period. AMOM has average monthly returns of 1.59% which is similar
to XMOM (1.53%) and more that twice as large as the return to NMOM (0.77%).
2Each of the conditional momentum strategies are constructed using the 6/1/6 portfolio method-
ology used to construct the MOM strategy.
3It is important to note that I do not claim that NMOM is all mispricing and AMOM contains no
mispricing. I simply claim that the arbitrage-impeding strategy contains relatively more mispricing
than the arbitrage-reinforcing strategy. If mispricing confounds empirical tests of risk explanations,
the arbitrage-reinforcing strategy should have a larger proportion of its profits explained as risk
compensation relative to the arbitrage-impeding strategy.
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Table 4.1
Conditional Momentum Strategy Summary Statistics (1967-2010)
This table presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and pairwise correlations (Panel B) for the set
of (conditional) momentum strategies. MOM represents returns to a portfolio that is long past
winners (MOM decile=9) and short past losers (MOM decile=0). Extreme momentum, XMOM ,
is similar to the formation of the momentum strategy that uses 30 portfolios instead of deciles.
AMOM represents returns to an arbitrage-reinforcing momentum strategy that is long under-
valued past winners (RFV3, MOM9) and short overvalued past losers (RFV1, MOM0). NMOM
represents returns to a arbitrage-impeding momentum strategy that is long overvalued past winners
(RFV1, MOM9) and short undervalued past losers (RFV3, MOM0). Portfolios are formed monthly
(based on returns measured during t-2 to t-7) and held for 6 months (t to t+5). One month is
skipped between measurement period and calculation of holding period returns to minimize mi-
crostructure issues. Additional variables included are the components of Fama and French 3-factor
model (RM−RF , HML, and SMB) and an Amihud (2002) return-based aggregate illiquidity risk
factor (AMILS).
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX P1 P25 P75 P99
MOM 0.0113 0.0138 0.046 -0.259 0.311 -0.144 -0.009 0.034 0.118
XMOM 0.0153 0.0167 0.059 -0.378 0.411 -0.164 -0.009 0.046 0.148
AMOM 0.0159 0.0158 0.049 -0.240 0.374 -0.140 -0.005 0.041 0.128
NMOM 0.0077 0.0096 0.054 -0.349 0.290 -0.136 -0.018 0.037 0.135
N -A -0.0082 -0.0080 0.048 -0.247 0.199 -0.126 -0.034 0.019 0.128
RM −RF 0.0045 0.0080 0.047 -0.231 0.161 -0.118 -0.023 0.036 0.111
HML 0.0040 0.0038 0.030 -0.128 0.138 -0.085 -0.013 0.018 0.082
SMB 0.0026 0.0007 0.032 -0.167 0.222 -0.067 -0.016 0.022 0.084
AMILS 0.0026 0.0010 0.040 -0.121 0.204 -0.099 -0.021 0.024 0.132
Panel B: Pairwise Correlations
MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM N -A RM −RF HML SMB
XMOM 0.97
AMOM 0.87 0.85
NMOM 0.89 0.87 0.58
N -A 0.11 0.11 -0.37 0.54
RM −RF -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 0.06 0.26
HML -0.21 -0.20 0.14 -0.47 -0.68 -0.32
SMB 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.31 -0.24
AMILS -0.17 -0.16 0.02 -0.30 -0.36 -0.08 0.16 0.68
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Table 4.1, Panel B presents the correlations between the various strategies. MOM
has a correlation of 0.97 with XMOM , 0.87 with AMOM and 0.89 with NMOM .4
AMOM has a correlation of 0.58 with NMOM and -0.37 with N -A. By condi-
tioning on the direction of arbitrage trades, there is clear separation on correlations
with the value factor (”HML”). AMOM is positively correlated with HML (0.14)
while NMOM(-0.47), MOM(-0.21), and XMOM(-0.20) are negatively correlated
with HML. There are also differences in correlation with the illiquidity risk factor.
AMOM(0.02) is positively correlated with AMILS while NMOM(-0.30), MOM(-
0.17), and XMOM(-0.16) are negatively correlated with AMILS. The difference
strategy designed to capture the influences of mispricing, N -A, is negatively corre-
lated with both HML (-0.68) and AMILS (-0.36).
4.2 Conditional Momentum Strategy Performance
If momentum profitability is the result of behavioral explanations, the average
returns to the strategy that is expected to contain more mispricing should have
higher average returns. Table 4.2 provides average returns and risk-adjusted returns
of the (conditional) momentum strategies for the period 1969 to 2010 and indicated
sub-periods. The sample starts at 1969 to allow a minimum of 24 months when
computing risk-adjusted returns. Risk adjustment is based on the Fama and French
(1993) 3-factor model using 60-month rolling regressions (requiring a minimum of 24
months). The average and risk-adjusted returns for MOM , XMOM , and AMOM
are positive and highly significant in the 1969 to 2010 period as well as each sub-
period with respective average monthly returns of 1.12% (t-statistic=5.53), 1.49%
(t-statistic=5.88), and 1.60% (t-statistic=7.70) for the 1969 to 2010 period. The
4Correlations presented in Table 4.1 suggest that the results are not simply the result of compound
sorting on past returns. Further, tests described later in Section 4 regarding long-term reversal and
expected momentum profits confirm that the results are not the result of sorting on more extreme
past returns. In untabulated results, I also drop momentum groups 1 and 30 and then repeat the
analysis and generate similar results.
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magnitudes between the AMOM and XMOM are similar across the time periods
with and without risk-adjustment. NMOM is positive and significant for the full
sample with an average monthly return of 0.75% (t-statistic=2.97). The average
monthly return of NMOM is not significant in the 1993 to 2010 sub-period, however
the risk-adjusted return is significant in each period. The average and risk-adjusted
returns of the difference strategy, N -A, are negative and significant in each period
with average monthly returns of -0.85% (t-statistic=-3.82) over the 1969 to 2010
period.5 Contrary to the behavioral explanations, the strategy expected to contain
relatively more mispricing has significantly lower returns.
Table 4.2 also reports the squared Sharpe ratios (multiplied by 100) (SSR) of
each of the momentum strategies computed similar to Brennan, Chordia, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998). The SSR for all momentum strategies is larger in the 1969 to
1992 sub-period than the 1993 to 2010 sub-period. The SSR for AMOM (10.34) is
larger than that of MOM (5.74), XMOM (6.39), and NMOM (1.92) suggesting
a greater return per unit risk for this strategy over the sample period 1969 to 2010
as well as each of the sub-periods. Also of interest is that each of the conditional
strategies has a higher SSR than the excess market return (RMRF , 0.77), value
factor (HML, 1.70) and size factor (SMB, 0.26) over the 1969 to 2010 period.
4.3 Long-term Reversal
This section explores the relationship between momentum, relative misvaluation, and
long-term reversal. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) demonstrate that average returns
to momentum portfolios exhibit positive returns over the initial 12 months which
5Over the 1926-1995 period, Grundy and Martin (2001) find average monthly momentum strategy
returns of -5.85% (t-statistic=-4.93) in Januaries and 1.01% (t-statistic=4.44) in other months. In
untabulated results, average monthly returns to the NMOM strategy (1967-2010) were -4.02%
(t-statistic=-3.86) in Januaries and 1.11% (t-statistic=4.28) in other months. By contrast, average
monthly returns to the AMOM strategy (1967-2010) were -1.13% (t-statistic=-1.20) in Januaries
and 1.69% (t-statistic=7.82) in other months.
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Table 4.2
Conditional Momentum Strategy Performance (1969-2010)
This table presents average returns, risk-adjusted returns, and squared Sharpe ratios for (condi-
tional) momentum (6/1/6) strategies formed on past returns and residual firm value (RFV) for
the period 1969-2010. RFV value is estimated using cross-sectional valuation regressions detailed
in Section 2.3. Panel A reports average and risk-adjusted returns for the momentum strategies.
Construction of the (conditional) momentum strategies is detailed in Table 4.1. RMRF , HML,
and SMB are the Fama and French factors downloaded from Ken French’s website. Portfolios
are formed monthly and held for 6 months. One month is skipped between measurement period
and calculation of holding period returns to minimize microstructure issues. Risk-adjustment is
based on the Fama and French 3-factor model (FF3) using 60-month rolling regressions (require a
minimum 24 months). T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates are based on Newey-West
standard errors.
Average Returns Risk-Adj. Returns(FF3) Squared Sharpe Ratios (x100)
1969-2010 1969-1992 1993-2010 1969-2010 1969-1992 1993-2010 1969-2010 1969-1992 1993-2010
Unconditional Momentum Strategies:
MOM 1.12 1.17 1.04 1.32 1.37 1.25 5.74 10.37 3.28
5.53 5.68 2.78 7.29 7.55 3.67
XMOM 1.49 1.62 1.30 1.75 1.88 1.58 6.39 13.39 3.12
5.88 6.29 2.77 7.79 8.67 3.65
Conditional Momentum Strategies:
AMOM 1.60 1.66 1.52 1.57 1.59 1.54 10.34 18.05 6.17
7.70 7.67 3.97 8.59 8.60 4.44
NMOM 0.75 0.87 0.59 1.15 1.26 0.99 1.92 3.87 0.82
2.97 3.46 1.25 5.66 6.51 2.62
N −A -0.85 -0.78 -0.93 -0.42 -0.33 -0.55 3.12 3.66 2.76
-3.82 -3.43 -2.27 -3.10 -2.26 -2.28
Fama and French 3-factors:
RMRF 0.41 0.33 0.52 0.77 0.48 1.28
1.83 1.13 1.48
HML 0.40 0.44 0.34 1.70 2.68 0.94
2.46 2.33 1.22
SMB 0.16 0.09 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.51
1.11 0.47 1.23
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partially reverse over a two to three year horizon.6 Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)
argue that long-term reversal is more consistent with mispricing and behavioral ex-
planations rather than sorts on unconditional expected returns as argued by Conrad
and Kaul (1998). I examine the long-term reversal of the (conditional) momentum
strategies which is commonly associated with investor overreaction to show that that
the conditional momentum strategies successfully separate firms according to their
relative level of mispricing. If mispricing is responsible for long-term reversal, then
the interaction of momentum traders and arbitrageurs suggests that the arbitrage-
impeding strategy, NMOM , should demonstrate a greater level of long-term reversal
than the arbitrage-reinforcing strategy, AMOM .
Table 4.3 presents average annual returns to stocks underlying the (conditional)
momentum strategies for each of the 5 years following portfolio formation. Returns
to each of the momentum strategies are positive in the initial year following portfolio
formation (all except NMOM are significant). MOM and XMOM both exhibit a
return profile that is consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman’s findings - returns are
positive and significant in the first year with reversal in the second and third year
following portfolio formation. Consistent with the argument that AMOM contains
less mispricing thanNMOM , Table 4.3 shows that there is no reversal in the AMOM
strategy, but negative and significant reversal in NMOM for each of the four years
following the first year after portfolio formation.7 Further, the difference strategy,
N -A, has negative and highly significant returns in each of the 5 years following
portfolio formation.
6Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find cumulative returns of approximately 9.5% in the first year that
decline by the end of the third year to approximately 4%. They argue that this provides evidence
that momentum is not the result of sorting on expected returns. They note that the reversal in years
2 and 3 is not significant due to the precision of the estimates over their sample period. Jegadeesh
and Titman (2001) demonstrate significant reversal in momentum portfolios in the second to fifth
year following portfolio formation.
7In untabulated results, the AMOM strategy has only 4 negative monthly returns (none significant
at 10% level) during the 36 months following portfolio formation, while NMOM is negative in 29
of the 36 months (significant in 21 at the 10% level).
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Table 4.3
Conditional Momentum Strategy Average Annual Post-Formation
Returns (1969-2010)
This table presents average annual post-formation returns of the stocks underlying the (conditional)
momentum strategies for each of the five years following portfolio formation for the period 1969-
2010. Construction of the (conditional) momentum strategies is detailed in Table 4.1. UMOM
represents returns to a relatively undervalued momentum strategy that is long undervalued past
winners and short undervalued past losers. FMOM and OMOM are relative momentum strategies
formed using relatively fairly valued and overvalued securities, respectively. Annual returns are
computed for the one to five years beginning with the initial holding period. One month is skipped
between measurement period and calculation of initial holding period to minimize microstructure
issues. Average returns are multiplied by 100. T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates are
based on Newey-West standard errors.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Long Short L-S Long Short L-S Long Short L-S Long Short L-S Long Short L-S
Unconditional Momentum Strategies:
MOM 15.51 7.20 8.30 12.58 16.53 -3.95 13.86 16.74 -2.88 16.98 16.56 0.42 16.65 17.48 -0.83
4.89 2.38 3.83 4.23 5.08 -2.16 4.83 4.85 -1.58 4.87 4.78 0.25 4.93 6.36 -0.39
XMOM 15.10 4.59 10.52 11.83 17.53 -5.70 12.64 16.97 -4.33 16.85 17.74 -0.89 17.32 17.91 -0.59
4.08 1.37 3.90 3.51 4.58 -2.37 4.03 4.24 -1.85 4.01 4.36 -0.44 4.24 6.13 -0.21
Conditional Momentum Strategies:
AMOM 18.63 3.86 14.77 16.48 13.34 3.14 17.08 14.71 2.37 19.78 14.24 5.53 18.42 16.11 2.31
5.77 1.31 6.51 5.40 4.44 1.66 5.71 4.32 1.09 5.36 4.28 2.60 4.82 5.92 0.81
NMOM 12.95 9.62 3.33 9.29 19.79 -10.50 11.42 18.22 -6.79 14.01 19.59 -5.58 14.34 18.71 -4.37
3.82 2.97 1.27 3.13 5.20 -4.23 3.82 5.03 -3.35 4.07 4.98 -2.80 4.39 6.38 -1.93
N −A -5.67 5.76 -11.44 -7.19 6.45 -13.64 -5.66 3.51 -9.16 -5.77 5.35 -11.12 -4.08 2.60 -6.68
-3.99 4.84 -5.23 -6.28 3.60 -5.61 -4.25 2.93 -4.21 -5.84 3.40 -5.23 -2.32 2.20 -3.02
Relative Value Momentum Strategies:
UMOM 18.63 9.62 9.01 16.48 19.79 -3.31 17.08 18.22 -1.13 19.78 19.59 0.18 18.42 18.71 -0.29
5.77 2.97 4.02 5.40 5.20 -1.48 5.71 5.03 -0.59 5.36 4.98 0.09 4.82 6.38 -0.09
FMOM 14.71 8.27 6.44 12.76 16.63 -3.87 13.07 17.24 -4.17 17.66 16.07 1.59 17.24 17.25 -0.01
4.97 2.79 3.00 4.24 5.25 -1.98 4.70 5.05 -2.09 5.15 4.84 0.88 5.28 6.42 -0.01
OMOM 12.95 3.86 9.10 9.29 13.34 -4.05 11.42 14.71 -3.28 14.01 14.24 -0.23 14.34 16.11 -1.77
3.82 1.31 3.81 3.13 4.44 -2.23 3.82 4.32 -1.73 4.07 4.28 -0.14 4.39 5.92 -0.95
U −O 5.67 5.76 -0.09 7.19 6.45 0.74 5.66 3.51 2.15 5.77 5.35 0.42 4.08 2.60 1.48
3.99 4.84 -0.06 6.28 3.60 0.42 4.25 2.93 1.66 5.84 3.40 0.27 2.32 2.20 0.73
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This evidence suggests that the interaction of momentum traders and arbitrageurs
significantly impacts the level of mispricing and profitability of the momentum strat-
egy. When momentum and arbitrage trades are aligned as in the AMOM strategy,
prices converge and there is relatively less mispricing. When momentum and arbi-
trage trades are not aligned, demand pressure from momentum traders may push
prices further away from fundamental value and may lead arbitrageurs to reduce
their arbitrage intensity. No long-term reversal (e.g. long-term positive returns) in
the AMOM strategy is consistent with Conrad and Kaul’s (1998) suggestion that
sorting on past returns results in effectively sorting firms according to unconditional
expected returns. The long-term reversal of returns to the NMOM strategy is
consistent with Jegadeesh and Titman’s (2001) argument that long-term reversal is
evidence of mispricing and behavioral explanations of momentum.
Together, the long-term reversal tests combined with the average returns of the
conditional strategies cast doubt on the ability of behavioral explanations to explain
average momentum profitability. The subset of momentum stocks that appear to
contain relatively more mispricing also have significantly lower returns.
One possible argument against this inference is that the evidence regarding long-
term reversal only rules out mispricing from the perspective of investor overreac-
tion, but not investor underreaction. It could be that the higher average returns
in AMOM are the result of investor underreaction to news in prior periods. Be-
havioral models of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999)
suggest that momentum profitability may result from a combination of investor over-
reaction and underreaction to value-relevant information. If momentum profitability
is the result of investor underreaction, this suggests that all market participants,
including arbitrageurs, systematically underreact to observable, value-relevant infor-
mation. However, the limits-to-arbitrage literature (and the model in Appendix A)
suggests that arbitrageurs will increase their arbitrage intensity when momentum
trades are expected to reinforce the arbitrage process (as compared to the case of
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no momentum trades). Thus, there should be little mispricing in momentum stocks
when arbitrageurs are able to observe past returns and infer that momentum trades
will expedite the correction of mispricing. If arbitrageurs supply sufficient capital to
eliminate mispricing due to investor underreaction, then momentum profits should
be largely due to cross-sectional differences in expected returns.
4.4 Expected Momentum Profits
This section analyzes the differences in risk exposure of the conditional momentum
strategies. While relative misvaluation can be caused by both mispricing and omit-
ted risk factors, the evidence presented thus far suggests that NMOM contains
more mispricing than AMOM . Since AMOM has significantly higher average re-
turns (Table 4.2) and contains less mispricing (Table 4.3) than NMOM , finance
theory suggests that AMOM should have higher exposure to priced risk factors.
Alternatively, if momentum profits are the result of mispricing, such as investor
underreaction, there should be little correlation between AMOM and priced risk
factors.
To estimate the influence of risk on each of the conditional momentum strategies,
I compute expected momentum profits for each (conditional) momentum strategy
following the approach of Liu and Zhang (2008). Table 4.4 estimates the proportion
of momentum strategy profits explained by two risk models that include risk factors
correlated with time-varying expected returns. Model 1 is the Fama and French
(1993) 3-factor model (FF3) augmented with change in industrial production (MP )
(i.e. Liu and Zhang (2008)) and Model 2 is the Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) five-factor
macroeconomic risk model (CRR) which includes change in industrial production
(MP ), unexpected inflation (UI), change in expected inflation (DEI), term spread
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(UTS), and default spread (UPR). The variables in the CRR model are constructed
as in Liu and Zhang (2008).8
Table 4.4, Panel A presents full-sample estimates of risk premia computed using
FMB regressions for each of the three models. Test assets (30 portfolios) include 10
Size portfolios, 10 B/M portfolios, and 10 Momentum portfolios downloaded from
Ken French’s website.9 In the first stage, time-series coefficients are estimated by
regressing the excess returns to the test assets on the risk factors in the indicated
model over the full sample period. In the second stage, I perform monthly cross-
sectional regressions of the excess returns to the test assets on the coefficient estimates
obtained in the first stage regressions. The risk premia estimates (E[γj]) are the time
series averages of the cross-sectional coefficient estimates obtained in the second-stage
regression. In Model 1, the estimated risk premium is significant for HML (0.61,
t-statistic=2.73) and MP (1.08, t-statistic=4.00). In Model 2, the risk premium is
significant for change in industrial production (MP , 1.43, t-statistic=2.41). Reported
t-statistics are corrected for the error-in-variables problem following Shanken (1992).
Table 4.4, Panel B presents full-sample time-series coefficient estimates obtained
by regressing each of the momentum strategies on the respective risk models. In
the interest of space, I will limit my discussion to the Fama and French (1993) 3-
factor model augmented with change in industrial production measure (MP ). The
loadings on RMRF are negative for both AMOM (-0.23, t-statistic=-3.02) and
NMOM (-0.10, t-statistic=-1.36). The NMOM strategy has a negative and highly
significant loading on HML (-0.94, t-statistic=-6.06), while AMOM has a positive
and insignificant loading (0.17, t-statistic=0.86). Both strategies have small and
8Similar results are achieved using the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model (FF3) which includes
excess market return (RMRF ), the value factor (HML), and the size factor (SMB).
9Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010) argue that the strong factor structure of the 25 size-B/M
portfolios commonly used in the academic literature can generate misleading results in asset pricing
tests. One of the suggestions to reduce the problem is to expand the set of test assets to reduce the
tight factor structure of the size-B/M portfolios. By following Liu and Zhang (2008), I minimize
this issue by including momentum portfolios as well as portfolios sorted independently on size and
portfolios independently sorted on B/M.
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Table 4.4
Expected Momentum Profits (1967-2010)
This table presents expected momentum profits to conditional momentum strategies for the period 1967 to 2010 for
two model specifications. Model 1 includes the Fama and French 3-factor model (excess market return-RMRF , value-
HML,and size-SMB) as well as MP . Model 2 includes macroeconomic risk variables (MP , UI, DEI, UTS, and
UPR). Conditional momentum strategies are defined in Table 4.1. Six-month holding period returns are calculated
for each portfolio. One month is skipped between measurement period and calculation of holding period returns to
minimize microstructure issues. Panel A reports risk premia estimates from a two-stage Fama-MacBeth regression
using 10 size, 10 book-to-market, and 10 momentum portfolios (from Ken French’s website) as test assets. T-statistics
below risk premia estimates are computed using standard errors corrected following Shanken (1992). Panel B reports
full-sample coefficients estimated by regressing each of the conditional momentum strategies on the risk factors in
the indicated model. Panel C reports the expected momentum profits (E[∗MOM ]) computed by multiplying the
appropriate risk exposure times the estimates price of risk, the expected momentum profits scaled by realized average
momentum profits (% − ∗MOM = E[∗MOM ]/ ∗MOM), and the p-value from a test of the difference in expected
returns between AMOM (E[AMOM ]) and each of the other strategies (E[∗MOM ]). T-statistics reported below
coefficient estimates are based on Newey-West standard errors.
Model 1: FF3 + ∆ Ind. Prod. Model 2: Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986)
Panel A: Estimated Risk Premia (γj estimates, 2-stage FMB using 10 MOM, 10 BM, and 10 SZ portfolios):
INT RMRF HML SMB MP INT MP UI DEI UTS UPR
E[γj ] 0.42 0.31 0.61 -0.14 1.08 E[γj ] 0.25 1.43 -0.10 -0.04 0.90 -0.42
0.64 0.48 2.73 -0.62 4.01 0.48 2.41 -0.70 -0.53 1.30 -1.61
Panel B: Time Series Risk (full-sample βj estimates) :
MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM N -A MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM N -A
RMRF -0.16 -0.20 -0.23 -0.10 0.13 MP 0.44 0.67 0.71 0.32 -0.38
-2.20 -2.26 -3.02 -1.36 2.98 1.75 2.25 2.41 1.16 -1.30
HML -0.38 -0.48 0.17 -0.94 -1.11 UI -0.54 -0.11 0.02 -1.07 -1.09
-2.19 -2.26 0.86 -6.06 -14.27 -0.49 -0.08 0.01 -0.88 -0.93
SMB 0.07 0.09 0.27 -0.12 -0.38 DEI 4.41 4.21 3.23 5.49 2.26
0.39 0.42 1.29 -0.73 -4.95 1.79 1.32 1.02 2.01 0.70
MP 0.73 0.98 0.93 0.66 -0.26 UTS -0.28 -0.42 -0.23 -0.44 -0.21
2.53 2.71 3.08 2.27 -1.71 -1.94 -2.17 -1.50 -2.25 -1.13
UPR -0.89 -0.88 -0.94 -0.76 0.18
-1.31 -1.00 -1.28 -1.00 0.31
Panel C: Expected Momentum Profits (E[∗MOM ] =∑Jj=1 βˆj ∗ γˆj) :
MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM N -A MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM N -A
RMRF -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 MP 0.55 0.82 0.92 0.40 -0.52
HML -0.23 -0.29 0.10 -0.57 -0.68 UI 0.34 0.36 0.18 0.47 0.29
SMB -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.06 DEI -0.48 -0.55 -0.33 -0.59 -0.26
MP 0.79 1.07 1.01 0.72 -0.29 UTS -0.15 -0.25 -0.11 -0.27 -0.16
UPR 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.30 -0.11
E[∗MOM ] 0.50 0.70 1.00 0.13 -0.87 E[∗MOM ] 0.62 0.79 1.07 0.27 -0.79
%− ∗MOM 44.3% 45.5% 62.7% 16.8% 105.7% %− ∗MOM 54.7% 51.7% 66.9% 35.3% 96.5%
Test E[AMOM ]− E[∗MOM ] = 0:
p-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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insignificant loadings on SMB. Both AMOM (0.93, t-statistic=3.08) and NMOM
(0.66, t-statistic=2.27) have positive and significant loadings on MP . The positive
and significant loadings on MP are consistent with (at least a portion of) momentum
profits being related to changes in expected returns that vary with the business cycle.
Table 4.4, Panel C computes expected momentum profits (E[∗MOM ])10 by sum-
ming up the product of the factor loadings estimated in Panel B and the risk premia
estimated in Panel A. For each of the models, the expected momentum profits of the
AMOM strategy are larger in magnitude than the other strategies with monthly ex-
pected return estimates of 1.00% in Model 1 and 1.07% in Model 2. For comparison,
the expected monthly return estimates for the NMOM strategy are 0.13% in Model
1 and 0.27% in Model 2. Thus, the expected strategy return due to risk exposure
for AMOM is 3 to 6 times larger than NMOM . The magnitude of the expected
return to AMOM is 30% to 100% larger than the expected returns to MOM and
XMOM .
I also compute the percentage of strategy returns explained by expected risk
premia (%-∗MOM) as E[∗MOM ] divided by average strategy returns. AMOM
has a higher %-∗MOM than any of the other strategies. For example, in Model 2,
the percentage of strategy returns explained by expected momentum profits for the
AMOM , NMOM , MOM , and XMOM strategies are respectively 66.9%, 35.3%,
54.7%, and 51.7%. For Model 1 the respective percentages are 62.7%, 16.8%, 45.5%,
and 44.3%. These results suggest that the profitability of the momentum strategy is
significantly related to compensation for factor risk exposure. Reported p-values at
the bottom of panel C show that E[AMOM ] is significantly larger than the expected
momentum profits of MOM , XMOM , and NMOM in both models with p-values
ranging from 0.00 to 0.05.
Together, these results suggest that stocks where momentum trades reinforce
arbitrage trades have higher average returns that contain less mispricing and are
10The notation ”*MOM” represents the (conditional) momentum strategy indicated by the column
heading.
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largely explained by exposure to priced risk factors. The ability of a standard set
of risk factors to explain more than two-thirds of the realized momentum profits
cast doubts on the ability of investor underreaction to explain average momentum
profitability.
4.5 Expected Growth Rates
Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggest that sorting firms on past returns is consistent with
sorting firms on unconditional expected returns. Empirical results in prior sections
show that AMOM has significantly higher average returns than NMOM . Results
related to long-term reversal provide evidence that conditioning on the direction of
arbitrage trades effectively sorts firms such that NMOM contains more mispricing
than AMOM . Results related to expected momentum profits suggest that the prof-
itability of the AMOM strategy is largely explained by risk compensation. If the
profitability of the momentum strategy is largely explained by cross-sectional differ-
ences in risk between winners and losers then there should be some cross-sectional
differences in proxies for expected returns (e.g. future growth rates).
Table 4.5 reports event-time averages of six firm-level measures for the long and
short portfolios of the AMOM and NMOM strategies. For each of the firm-level
measures, an equal-weighted average of the measure is computed for each of the indi-
cated portfolios at the indicated points in time. Current represents the average firm
measures at initial portfolio formation computed based on information known at time
t. The 1 yr column reports the average firm measures based on information known
12 months after portfolio formation. The 2 yr to 5 yr columns report the average
firm measures computed at the indicated period following portfolio formation.
RFV . Current period values of RFV show that firms in the AMOM -Long (Short)
and NMOM -Short (Long) portfolio are relatively undervalued (overvalued) on av-
erage. The misvaluation persists beyond the current period, but converges towards
zero over the subsequent 5 years. This is consistent with the correction of mis-
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Table 4.5
Conditional Momentum Strategies and Firm Operating Performance (1967-2010)
This table presents average operating performance statistics for the long and short legs of the
conditional momentum strategies for the period 1967 to 2010. Construction of the (conditional)
momentum strategies is detailed in Table 4.1. Current represents the time series average of the
operating statistics measured at the beginning of the initial holding period. Time series averages of
the operating statistics are also reported in 1 year increments for up to 5 years following portfolio
formation (1 yr...5 yr). All firms are included in the periods for which they have valid measures.
RFV is computed as described in Section II, Price-to-Earnings ratio is computed as market equity
scaled by net income. Asset Growth is the one year percentage change in total assets. Sales
Growth is the one year percentage change in total sales. Cashflow is computed as net income plus
depreciation plus deferred taxes. Cashflow Margin is current year cashflow divided by current year
sales. Cashflow ROE is computed as Cashflow divided by prior period book equity.
Portfolio Current 1 yr 2 yr 3 yr 4 yr 5 yr Current 1 yr 2 yr 3 yr 4 yr 5 yr
RFV Price-to-Earnings Ratio
AMOM -Long -0.35 -0.17 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19 -0.19 10.1 15.5 15.0 16.1 14.9 15.2
NMOM-Long 1.04 0.69 0.42 0.33 0.29 0.27 43.1 32.2 25.8 22.2 22.4 21.1
AMOM -Short 0.46 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.16 23.6 17.5 17.8 18.9 19.2 19.3
NMOM-Short -0.89 -0.55 -0.36 -0.32 -0.29 -0.27 6.4 10.8 11.4 14.0 13.5 14.4
Asset Growth (1-year) Sales Growth (1-year)
AMOM -Long 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13
NMOM-Long 0.22 0.34 0.38 0.28 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.33 0.34 0.24 0.19 0.17
AMOM -Short 0.30 0.31 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14
NMOM-Short 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.11
Cashflow Margin (CF/Sales) Cashflow ROE (CF/Lagged Book Equity)
AMOM -Long 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.23 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29
NMOM-Long 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.37 0.39 0.34 0.31 0.29
AMOM -Short 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27
NMOM-Short 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.25
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pricing or the systematic convergence of stock prices to industry-average valuations.
Supporting the hypothesized interaction of arbitrageurs and momentum traders, the
apparent correction is larger in the portfolios designed to contain a relatively higher
level of mispricing (NMOM portfolios).
Price− to− Earnings (P/E). Current values of average P/E ratios show that firms
in the AMOM -Long (Short) andNMOM -Short (Long) portfolios have relatively low
(high) P/E ratios. The relatively lower (higher) market price per dollar in earnings
persists after the Current period, but converges towards the mean (relatively high
(low) P/E ratios decrease (increase)) over the subsequent five years. The larger
average correction in P/E ratios for firms in the portfolios that appear to contain
relatively more mispricing (NMOM) is also consistent with investor overreaction.
If the profitability of the momentum strategy is largely explained by cross-sectional
differences in risk between winners and losers then there should be some cross-
sectional differences in proxies for expected returns between winners and losers. To
test this, I compute one-year measures of asset growth and sales growth at portfolio
formation and for each of the subsequent five years (as proxies for expected growth
rates).
Asset Growth (1-yr). Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008, CGS) find a negative rela-
tionship between future returns and one-year asset growth which they attribute to
behavioral explanations. Specifically, they argue that ”investors over extrapolate
past gains to growth.” If the findings of CGS are primarily the result of behavioral
explanations, I may find evidence of differences between the AMOM and NMOM
strategies.
Average asset growth in the AMOM -Long strategy starts at 11% and ranges
from 10 to 16% over the subsequent periods. The AMOM -Short portfolio demon-
strates declining asset growth rates moving from 30% in the current period to 14%
in the fifth year following portfolio formation. The relatively stable but increasing
(decreasing) asset growth rates in the AMOM -Long (Short) portfolio combined with
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movements of P/E ratios in the same direction suggests that cross-sectional differ-
ences in expected returns is a plausible explanation for momentum profits in the
AMOM strategy.
The average asset growth rate for firms in the NMOM -Long portfolio starts at
22%, increases to 38%, and then falls back to 19%. For NMOM , the relatively higher
growth rates, higher price-to-earnings ratios, and NMOM ’s underperformance rel-
ative to AMOM are consistent with CGS’s suggestion that the negative relation-
ship between asset growth and future returns is due to investor overextrapolation of
growth opportunities.
Sales Growth (1-yr). Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, LSV) suggest that the
underperformance of growth stocks may be due to investors overestimating future
growth rates of growth stocks. If the overestimation of future growth rates results
in mispricing, firms in the AMOM and NMOM strategies may have differences in
variables that reflect firm growth such as sales growth. Similar to asset growth, I
look at one-year change in sales and find a similar pattern.
The AMOM -Long portfolio demonstrates relatively stable average sales growth
rates starting at 12% and reaching as high as 17% in the 2nd year and then falling
back to 13% in the fifth year. The AMOM -Short portfolio demonstrates a steady
reduction in sales growth rates decreasing from 28% in the current period to 14%
in the fifth year following portfolio formation. Similar to the findings with respect
to future asset growth rates, this is consistent with cross-sectional differences in
expected returns.
In contrast, NMOM -Long starts at 23%, increases to 34% and then falls back
to 17%. The results are very similar to the asset growth category. The moderate
increase in AMOM -Long sales growth rates over the subsequent 5 years is less likely
to result in investor overreaction than the substantial increases in sales growth rates
achieved by stocks in the NMOM -Long portfolio. The relatively higher sales growth
rates in NMOM combined with the substantially higher price-to-earnings ratios are
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consistent with LSV’s suggestion that investors overreact to past growth rate signals
such as sales growth when estimating future growth rates.
Profitability. The results related to asset growth and sales growth provide convincing
evidence that the returns to the AMOM and NMOM portfolios are at least par-
tially due to cross-sectional differences in expected firm growth rates. Large changes
in P/E ratios for NMOM portfolio relative to AMOM portfolio provides additional
evidence that NMOM contains more mispricing than AMOM . Further, the mis-
pricing is consistent with investor overreaction to imprecise signals of firm growth
rates. If there are cross-sectional differences in the profitability generated by the
investing and sales activities, this apparent overreaction may be justified.
To confirm that there are not systematic differences in profitability, I compute
the sales margin (cashflow/sales) and return on equity (”ROE”, cashflow/lagged
book equity). The results indicate that the average sales margin is similar between
the AMOM -Long and NMOM -Long portfolios, so the apparent overreaction to
Sales Growth is not likely the result of cross-sectional differences in sales margin.
Similarly, cross-sectional differences in the ROE may partially explain the apparent
overreaction to signals of firm growth. AMOM -Long portfolio has an initial average
book ROE of 23% while the NMOM -Long starts at 26%. At the end of 5 years,
both portfolios have an ROE of 29%. AMOM had relatively stable ROE across the
5 years while NMOM increased to as high as 39% before dropping back to 29%.
The volatility of the ROE, similar to the volatility of asset and sales growth rates,
combined with the large differences in price-to-earnings ratios suggests that investor
overextrapolation of future growth rates was larger in the portfolio where momentum
trades impede arbitrage.
Overall, these finding are consistent with the previous results which suggest that
momentum returns are largely explained by cross-sectional differences in expected
returns. For both AMOM and NMOM , winners have increasing future asset and
sales growth rates while losers have decreasing growth rates. Interestingly, growth
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rates for the NMOM winners portfolio are higher (and more volatile) than growth
rates for the AMOM winners portfolio. The NMOM strategies also have a relatively
larger average correction in P/E ratios over the 5 years following portfolio formation.
The larger P/E corrections and more volatile growth rates suggest that at least a
portion of the mispricing in NMOM may be due to investor overreaction to past
growth rates (e.g. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Cooper, Gulen, and
Schill (2008)). This correction in mispricing appears to mask the underlying cross-
sectional differences in future sales and asset growth rates between winners and losers
in the NMOM portfolio which may help to partially explain the relatively low level
of expected momentum profits for the NMOM strategy in Table 4.4.
4.6 Short-Sale Constraints and Overvaluation
The analyses in the preceding sections suggest that momentum trades impede
the arbitrage process. In this section I take a deeper look at the apparent investor
overreaction (e.g. long-term reversal) of stocks in the arbitrage-impeding strategy.
Specifically, I consider the interaction of arbitrageurs and momentum traders in the
context of proxies for short-sale constraints and divergence of opinion. Miller (1977)
develops a model where divergence of opinion in the presence of short-sale constraints
can result in optimistic investors holding stocks at overvalued prices (i.e. above the
equilibrium prices without short-sale constraints). This may result in the apparent
investor overreaction observed in the arbitrage impeding strategy.
I start with a word of caution on this analysis. Divergence of opinion and short-
sale constraints are not completely exogenous with respect to the interaction of arbi-
trageurs and momentum traders proposed in this paper. When momentum traders
purchase overvalued winners, their demand pushes prices upwards away from funda-
mental value. As a result, I expect to find a relatively higher divergence of opinion
by the nature of their trading in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades. Similar
to noise trader risk, momentum traders purchasing overvalued winners can act as a
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short-sale constraint on arbitrageurs which leads to a reduction in arbitrage intensity
allowing mispricing to persist or deepen. In Table 4.6, Panel A, I start by computing
the time-series average RFV for each portfolio to demonstrate that there appears to
be a greater level of misvaluation in the overvalued winners and undervalued losers
portfolios.
In Table 4.6, Panel B, I examine whether the apparent mispricing is due to
non-momentum related short-sale constraints on stocks in the overvalued stocks. If
short-sale constraints are binding, arbitrageurs would be unable to eliminate the
mispricing because they cannot short the stock because it is not available to be
borrowed. This differs from the proposed interaction of momentum traders and
arbitrageurs where arbitrageurs choose not to short the stock in anticipation of mo-
mentum trades causing mispricing to deepen. Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and
Tice (2009) use institutional ownership as a proxy for short sale constraints. The
idea is that institutional traders are the primary source of lending, so stocks with
low institutional ownership are considered as having binding short-sale constraints.
Contrary to this explanation, I find that overvalued stocks have significantly higher
average institutional ownership than undervalued stocks. The difference between
overvalued winners and losers is not significant. This suggests that short-selling
constraints are not binding on average for the stocks that become most overvalued.
In Table 4.6, Panels C and D, I examine whether the apparent mispricing is due to
divergence of opinion between investors. For dispersion of opinion, I use two measures
motivated in Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006, BDS), Turnover (Panel C) and
Idiosyncratic Volatility (Panel D). Unlike measures based on analyst estimates, these
measures have the benefit of being available for most stocks in CRSP. BDS test the
Miller (1997) hypothesis that short sale constraints combined with divergence of
opinion will lead to overvaluation. My results demonstrate that overvalued winners
have relatively higher turnover and higher idiosyncratic volatility, both consistent
with a higher divergence of opinion.
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Table 4.6
Misvaluation and Stock Characteristics (1967-2010)
This table presents time-series averages of cross-sectional average stock characteristics for portfolios
used to construct the conditional momentum strategies. See Table 4.1 for additional details on the
construction of these strategies. Institutional Ownership is measured quarterly as the aggregate
holdings from the Thomson Reuters Institutional (13-F) Holdings database (s34) divided by shares
outstanding. Turnover and Idiosyncratic Volatility are measured monthly as described in Section
3.3. Institutional Ownership is measured quarterly from 1980 to 2010, all others are based on
monthly measures from 1967 to 2010. T-statistics reported below mean estimates are based on
Newey-West standard errors.
MOM0, ”Losers” MOM9, ”Winners” W-L
Panel A: RFV (Monthly)
RFV1, Overvalued 0.386 0.984 0.598
22.91 33.15 16.88
RFV3, Undervalued -0.843 -0.305 0.538
-40.33 -21.25 23.18
U-O -1.230 -1.289 -0.059
-45.58 -40.22 -2.670
Panel B: Institutional Ownership (Quarterly)
RFV1, Overvalued 0.431 0.442 0.012
12.14 13.13 1.24
RFV3, Undervalued 0.407 0.365 -0.042
10.76 11.36 -3.75
U-O -0.024 -0.078 -0.054
-3.37 -10.54 -5.048
Panel C: Turnover (Monthly)
RFV1, Overvalued 0.137 0.186 0.049
10.05 10.81 6.02
RFV3, Undervalued 0.101 0.115 0.014
9.70 11.94 2.24
U-O -0.036 -0.071 -0.035
-6.18 -8.27 -5.489
Panel D: Idiosyncratic Volatility (Monthly)
RFV1, Overvalued 0.026 0.025 -0.001
32.04 33.17 -1.47
RFV3, Undervalued 0.028 0.025 -0.003
32.89 32.29 -4.54
U-O 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
4.57 -3.64 -7.768
53
While I find relatively higher divergence of opinion in overvalued winners, the in-
stitutional ownership results suggest that short-sale constraints are not binding. BDS
point out that divergence of opinion and short sale constraints are jointly required
for overvaluation in the Miller (1977) model. I argue that the apparent overvaluation
is a result of a divergence of opinion between momentum traders and arbitrageurs,
with momentum trades endogenously acting as a short-sale constraint for the arbi-
trageur. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesized interaction of
arbitrageurs and momentum traders.
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5. MOMENTUM, MISPRICING, AND THE VALUE STRATEGY
Motivated by significantly different loadings on HML in time series tests, I ex-
plore the negative correlation between the momentum and value strategies docu-
mented in Asness (1997). Asness (1997) finds that momentum and value strategies
are positively related to future returns, but are negatively related to each other. He
finds that value strategies work best in past loser stocks and are least profitable
in stocks classified as past winners. It seems reasonable that this negative correla-
tion is the result of constraints on arbitrage activity imposed by momentum traders.
When arbitrageurs or relative value traders expect that momentum trades will be
profitable, they may reduce their capital intensity allowing mispricing to persist or
deepen.1 All else equal, a reduction in arbitrage intensity allows mispricing to persist
(or deepen) and results in lower returns to relative value strategies such as HML.
As past returns are observable, arbitrageurs may reduce the capital allocated to arbi-
trage opportunities in which momentum traders are trading in the opposite direction.
Thus I expect the negative correlation to be the strongest in the arbitrage-impeding
strategy.
To examine the influence of momentum traders on relative value traders, I com-
pute conditional mean returns to the value strategy (HML) where the state is de-
termined by the prior period NMOM strategy returns. As a baseline, Table 5.1,
Panel A shows that 42.4% of the monthly returns to HML are less than zero while
39.8% of the monthly returns to the arbitrage-impeding strategy are unprofitable.
Table 5.1, Panel B, reports the conditional mean momentum strategy returns for
each of two states defined by the lagged returns to HML. The arbitrage-impeding
strategy has an average monthly return of 0.34% when the prior month return to
HML is profitable, and 1.36% when HML is unprofitable in the prior month. The
difference in conditional means between the two states is significant (p-value=0.002).
1Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggests that arbitrageurs may face funding constraints following pe-
riods of poor past performance (low returns and/or high volatility).
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Table 5.1
Conditional Momentum Strategies and the Value Strategy (1967-2010)
This table presents average momentum (value) strategy returns conditional on prior period value
(momentum) strategy returns for the period 1967 to 2010. Panel A reports the percentage of months
where the monthly return is less than zero for the indicated strategy. HML is the value strategy
factor downloaded from Ken French’s website. Construction of the (conditional) momentum strate-
gies is detailed in Table 4.1. Panel B reports the average one-month return to momentum strategies
conditioned on performance of the value strategy in the prior period. L1.HML ≥ 0 (L1.HML < 0)
represents the average momentum strategy return when the prior period HML return is greater
than or equal to (less than) zero. Panel C reports the average one-month return to the value strategy
conditioned on the prior period performance of the indicated momentum strategy. L1.∗MOM ≥ 0
(L1. ∗ MOM < 0) represents the average value strategy return when the prior period ∗MOM
strategy return is greater than or equal to (less than) zero. ∗MOM represents the (conditional)
momentum strategy used for conditioning the value strategy returns which is indicated in the row
labeled ”Conditioning Variable:.” T-statistics reported below coefficient estimates are based on
Newey-West standard errors.
Panel A: Percentage of strategy returns less than zero
Variable: HML MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM NMA
%−Negative 42.4 33.7 33.0 30.9 39.8 58.3
Panel B: Average momentum strategy returns conditioned on lagged HML returns
Dependent Variable: MOM XMOM AMOM NMOM NMA
Conditioning Variable: L1.HML L1.HML L1.HML L1.HML L1.HML
L1.HML ≥ 0 0.85 1.19 1.46 0.34 -1.12
3.08 3.32 5.23 1.05 -4.38
L1.HML < 0 1.50 1.99 1.78 1.36 -0.42
5.80 6.31 6.69 4.02 -1.33
Test of Equality:
p-value 0.0076 0.1379 0.4778 0.0017 0.0000
Panel C: Average value strategy returns conditioned on lagged momentum returns
Dependent Variable: HML HML HML HML HML
Conditioning Variable: L1.MOM L1.XMOM L1.AMOM L1.NMOM L1.NMA
L1. ∗MOM ≥ 0 0.15 0.28 0.45 0.04 -0.16
0.83 1.52 2.39 0.23 -0.77
L1. ∗MOM < 0 0.89 0.64 0.28 0.94 0.80
3.76 3.12 1.41 4.04 4.90
Test of Equality:
p-value 0.0822 0.0954 0.3935 0.0283 0.0760
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For the arbitrage-reinforcing strategy, there is no significant difference (p-value=0.48)
in conditional means between the two states (lagged HML profitable or not). This
conditional performance of the NMOM strategy (conditioned on the performance of
HML) is consistent with the predicted interactions of momentum traders and arbi-
trageurs. When value traders are successful in keeping mispricing in check, momen-
tum trades that rely on pushing prices away from fundamental value are relatively
less successful.
Table 5.1, Panel C reports the conditional mean HML returns for each of two
states defined by the lagged returns to the conditional momentum strategies. The
difference in mean returns between the two states is highly significant when HML
returns are conditioned on lagged NMOM strategy returns and insignificant when
conditioned on lagged AMOM strategy returns. The mean return to HML is 0.04%
when the prior period return to NMOM strategy is profitable and 0.94% when the
NMOM strategy is unprofitable. However, the mean return to HML is 0.45%
when the prior period returns to AMOM strategy is profitable and 0.28% when it is
unprofitable. The difference in means between the two states is highly significant (p-
value = 0.03) when returns are conditioned on lagged returns to theNMOM strategy
and insignificant when conditioned on lagged returns to the AMOM strategy (p-
value = 0.39). This conditional performance of the HML strategy (conditioned on
the performance of the arbitrage-impeding momentum strategy) is consistent with
the predicted interactions of momentum traders and arbitrageurs. When momentum
traders are successful at pushing prices away from fundamental value, value traders
are less likely to invest in apparent mispricing, allowing the mispricing to persist or
deepen. Similarly, value traders profit by correcting the mispricing when momentum
strategies are less profitable and possibly face funding constraints.
In a recent working paper, Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2009) show that
momentum is negatively correlated with the value strategy and demonstrate that a
combination of the two strategies performs better than either strategy alone. The
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source of this improved performance is unclear in light of my findings that MOM
and NMOM each demonstrate a negative correlation with HML, while AMOM ,
the strategy with the highest average returns, is positively correlated with HML.
The results in Table 5.1 suggest that a possible explanation of their finding is that
NMOM may serve as a hedge against momentum trader risk for value-based strate-
gies.
Together these results suggest that the arbitrage-impeding strategy and HML in-
teract in a manner consistent with the hypothesized interaction of momentum traders
and arbitrageurs. The profitability of a relative value strategy is negatively related to
the profitability of the momentum strategy. When the momentum strategy is prof-
itable, momentum traders are able to raise capital which impedes the profitability
of the value traders positions. Likewise, when momentum is unprofitable, relative
value traders are able to generate significant profits.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the interaction of momentum traders and arbitrageurs, this disser-
tation examines behavioral and rational explanations of momentum strategy prof-
itability. I provide evidence that suggests that momentum trading is a source of risk
to arbitrageurs similar to noise trader risk (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Wald-
mann (1990) and Shleifer and Summers (1990)) and as such, standard arbitrage
processes may not eliminate mispricing when momentum traders and arbitrageurs
trade in opposite directions.
Empirical tests show that a momentum strategy that reinforces the arbitrage pro-
cess: has relatively higher returns that are largely explained as risk compensation,
does not exhibit long-term reversal, and has observable differences in future growth
rates between past winners and losers consistent with cross-sectional differences in ex-
pected returns. Returns to a momentum strategy that impedes the arbitrage process
exhibit significant long-term reversal consistent with the model’s prediction that this
strategy contains relatively more mispricing (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)).
Further, the past winners and losers in the arbitrage-impeding strategy have firm
measures that are also consistent with cross-sectional differences in expected growth
rates, but future corrections in price-earnings multiples suggest an overreaction to
these relatively noisy signals.
Momentum trades appear to impede arbitrage when they are in opposite direc-
tions of arbitrage trades, and reinforce the arbitrage process when they are in the
same direction. When momentum investors trade unconditionally with respect to
fundamental value, demand pressure on overvalued winners and undervalued losers
may push prices further from intrinsic value and mispricing may not be arbitraged
away. It seems reasonable that rational arbitrageurs may condition the capital al-
located to arbitrage opportunities on the observed past returns resulting in delayed
arbitrage when momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrage trades.
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Similarly, arbitrageurs may expedite arbitrage if they expect momentum trades to
reinforce the arbitrage process.
Together, it appears that the profitability of the momentum strategy is largely
driven by cross-sectional differences in expected returns. The mispricing component
of momentum returns appears to mask the underlying cross-sectional differences
in expected returns between winners and losers leading to the mixed results doc-
umented in the literature. Long-term reversal, generally associated with investor
overreaction, appears to be isolated in the least profitable conditional momentum
strategy and thus it is unlikely that behavioral explanations are the primary expla-
nation of the momentum strategy’s profitability. Similarly, the significantly larger
proportion of momentum profits explained as risk compensation in the arbitrage-
reinforcing strategy, which has significantly higher returns, suggests that average
momentum profitability is not explained by investor underreaction.
The findings in this paper suggest that the interaction of arbitrageurs and un-
conditional momentum traders has implications for market efficiency. Unconditional
momentum traders appear to impede arbitrage for relatively overvalued past win-
ners and undervalued past losers. Trading strategies that do not condition on relative
valuation may impose constraints on arbitrage activity in a manner consistent with
noise trader risk.
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APPENDIX A
A MODEL OF MOMENTUM TRADING AND ARBITRAGE
The objective of this simple model is to demonstrate that under certain condi-
tions unconditional momentum trading can impede arbitrage by affecting the ar-
bitrageur’s capital allocation decision. The intuition is straightforward; momen-
tum trades aligned with arbitrage trades facilitate price convergence to fundamental
value, while momentum trades in the opposite direction of arbitrageur trades slow
price convergence and may push prices further away from fundamental value. Ar-
bitrageurs respond by reducing arbitrage intensity when they expect momentum
trades to impede price convergence, and increasing arbitrage intensity when they
expect momentum trades to reinforce the arbitrage process.
Consider the case of a risk-neutral representative arbitrageur and a pair of (oth-
erwise identical) mispriced stocks. The two stocks have identical cash flows and
fundamental values, but one stock is overvalued and one is undervalued. To trade on
this mispricing, the arbitrageur invests in a long-short portfolio by taking a long po-
sition in the undervalued stock and a short position in the overvalued stock. Because
the arbitrageur trades offsetting long and short positions, systematic risk is elimi-
nated from the portfolio. As the mispricing is symmetric, I will focus my discussion
on one side of the transaction.
The mispriced stock can be either overvalued or undervalued and follows a price
process, p(t) = FV ±m(t) where FV equals the fundamental value of the stock that
is observed by the arbitrageur and m(·) represents the level of mispricing. There
is also a representative momentum trader and a representative long-term investor,
neither of which possess the skill or technology required to observe the mispricing.
Momentum trading is assumed to be based only on past returns (i.e. unconditional
with respect to fundamental value or expected arbitrage intensity).
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This model does not consider the processes by which mispricing initially arises,
but simply that a demand shock results in the initial mispricing. Mispricing is
assumed to correct at some random time in the future when an exogenous event (such
as widespread release of value relevant information) shifts the demand schedule of
the long-term investor.1 The mispricing is such that a finite position will eliminate
the mispricing. The long-term investor provides a static demand schedule, D(·), for
the total mispricing, m(t), such that:
m(t) = D(z(t)) = |p(t)− FV | (A.1)
where z(t) represents time t aggregate demand from arbitrage capital and follows:
z(t) = x(t) + y(t) ∗DIR[ARB] ∗DIR[MOM ] (A.2)
where z(t) is net arbitrage demand for the mispriced stock, x(t) is the absolute value
of the arbitrageur demand in shares at time t (i.e. positive for both long and short
positions), y(t) is the absolute value of momentum trader demand at time t, and
DIR[·] is a direction function that is equal to one when the indicated trader takes a
long position and negative one when the indicated trader takes a short position.
The demand schedule is denominated in terms of mispricing to simplify dis-
cussion. The demand schedule is continuous and mispricing is monotonically de-
creasing in z(t). The momentum trader will take a long position in recent winners
and short position in recent losers, while the arbitrageur will purchase undervalued
stocks and sell overvalued stocks. The arbitrageur does not observe y(t), but in-
fers the direction and magnitude of y(t) based on observed past returns. Together,
DIR[ARB]*DIR[MOM] equals one when momentum trades are in the same direction
as arbitrage trades (e.g. undervalued winners or overvalued losers) and negative one
1The framework of this simplified model builds on the model of risky arbitrage in Kondor (2009).
In his model, an arbitrageur trades a single, fundamentally riskless security listed on two different
markets where a decrease in aggregate arbitrage activity leads to a deepening in mispricing.
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when they are in the opposite direction (e.g. overvalued winners or undervalued
losers).
To profit from the mispricing, the arbitrageur buys (sells) x(t) shares of the
mispriced stock when it is undervalued (overvalued). The mispricing persists over
the random interval [0, t˜] at which time the mispricing is eliminated by an exogenous
event (i.e. p(t˜) = FV ). Time t˜ is distributed exponentially with constant hazard
rate, δ, and density e−δt. Thus, the Prob[t˜ ≤ t] is 1 − e−δt. The arbitrageur starts
with initial capital = c(0) and cannot raise additional capital for this arbitrage
opportunity. The arbitrageur is required to maintain a non-negative capital position
at all times (c(t) ≥ 0 for all t). For simplicity, I assume that transaction costs are
zero and margin requirements are the same for both long and short positions. Given
these assumptions, the arbitrageur chooses his trading position to solve the following
problem:
J(c(0)) = max
x(t)
∫ ∞
0
δe−δt(m(t)x(t) + c(t))dt (A.3)
s.t. c(t) = c(0)−
∫ m(t)
m(0)
x(u)dm(u) (A.4)
c(t) ≥ 0
The capital constraint suggests that arbitrage is risky. When time t = t˜ the ar-
bitrageur profits from the correction of the mispricing (m(t)x(t)) and realizes the
cumulative unrealized gains and losses on the position which are included in the
current capital position (c(t)). However, if mispricing deepens to the point that cu-
mulative losses exceed initial capital at any time t < t˜, the arbitrageur will be forced
to close his position prior to realizing this profit. The arbitrageur’s capital position
is directly affected by the level of trading activity as can be seen by the marginal
change in arbitrageur capital:
dc(t)
dt
= −x(t)dm(t)
dt
= −x(t)dD(z(t))
dz
dz(t)
dt
(A.5)
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SinceD(·) is monotonically decreasing in z(t), an increase in z(t) results in an increase
in arbitrage capital and a decrease in mispricing. Momentum trading directly effects
net arbitrage capital and mispricing since z(t) is increasing in y(t) ∗ DIR[ARB] ∗
DIR[MOM ]:
dz(t)
dy
=
{
> 0 when DIR[ARB] ∗DIR[MOM ] = 1
< 0 when DIR[ARB] ∗DIR[MOM ] = −1 (A.6)
This relation suggests that when momentum trades are in the same direction as
arbitrageur trades (DIR[ARB] ∗DIR[MOM ] = 1), momentum trades reduce mis-
pricing as net arbitrageur capital increases. Similarly, when momentum trades are
in the opposite direction of arbitrageur trades (DIR[ARB] ∗ DIR[MOM ] = −1),
momentum trades increase mispricing as net arbitrageur capital decreases.
To provide a discussion around the basic implications of this model I consider
three cases: 1) no demand from momentum traders, 2) momentum trades are in the
same direction as arbitrageur trades, and 3) momentum trades are in the opposite
direction of arbitrageur trades. For discussion purposes, I assume that arbitrage
traders trade first at each time t unless otherwise noted.
Case 1 (No Momentum Traders): When there is no momentum trading activity,
there is no risk in the arbitrage opportunity. To keep the model simple, momentum
trades are the only source of demand shocks that can cause mispricing to deepen
to a point that capital constraints are binding and the arbitrageur is forced to close
his position at a loss. The arbitrageur will invest the lesser of total capital and the
capital required to eliminate mispricing (e.g. m(t) = 0) at time 0 and will hold
the position until mispricing is eliminated by the time t˜ exogenous event. If the
arbitrageur exits his positions prior to the event, the static demand schedule results
in exiting the positions at initial cost.
Case 2 (Arbitrage-Reinforcing Momentum Traders): In this case, momentum
traders take a long position in undervalued past winners or a short position in over-
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valued past losers. The demand pressure from momentum trades pushes prices to-
wards fundamental value (i.e. static demand schedule). All else equal, mispricing
will be lower and there is no risk that mispricing will deepen. If there was another
source of risk in the model, such as noise trader risk or fundamental risk, momentum
trades would lower the total risk of an arbitrageur being forced to close his posi-
tion prior to correction of mispricing at t˜. Since the arbitrageur trades first, he will
maximize his profit by investing the lesser of total capital and the capital required
to eliminate mispricing (e.g. m(t) = 0) at time 0. If the momentum trader trades
first, the arbitrageur would trade the lesser of F (0) − y(t) shares and total capital
where F (·) is the inverse demand schedule with F (m(t)) = z(t). All else equal,
demand pressure from momentum traders may shift the stock’s price such that the
arbitrageur can exit his position with a gain (dependent upon the level of momentum
trader demand) prior to time t˜.
Case 3 (Arbitrage-Impeding Momentum Traders): In this case, momentum traders
take a long position in overvalued past winners or a short position in undervalued
past losers. All else equal, demand pressure from momentum trades pushes prices
away from fundamental value. Demand pressure from momentum trades (y(t)) may
move the stock’s price such that the arbitrageur faces a loss when exiting his posi-
tion prior to time t˜. If x(t) − y(t) ≥ 0, the static demand schedule suggests that
momentum traders reduce the effect of arbitrage capital and mispricing persists. If
x(t)−y(t) < 0, the static demand schedule suggests that mispricing will deepen. This
demand pressure from momentum traders increases the risk that the arbitrageur is
forced to close his position prior to correction of mispricing at t˜. As the arbitrageur
trades first and y(t) is unobservable, the arbitrageur must infer the level of y(t) from
the observed past returns. Because of the risk that mispricing will deepen, the arbi-
trageur’s allocation to the arbitrage opportunity (x(t)) will be strictly less than his
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available capital (c(t)) when observed past returns suggest that momentum traders
will trade in the opposite direction of arbitrageurs.2
This model suggests that demand from momentum traders can affect the alloca-
tion of arbitrage capital and as a result has a significant impact on market efficiency.
Their trades may reinforce the arbitrage process causing mispricing to correct faster,
or they may impede the arbitrage process enabling mispricing to persist and in some
cases deepen. The model suggests that an arbitrage-impeding momentum strategy
contains more mispricing than an arbitrage-reinforcing strategy.3 This result follows
from the reduction in net arbitrage capital (net arbitrage capital = arbitrage capital
plus effect of momentum capital) which results in persistence of mispricing, all else
equal. Thus arbitrage-reinforcing momentum capital speeds price convergence (in-
creases net arbitrage capital) while arbitrage-impeding momentum capital impedes
price convergence (reduces net arbitrage capital).4
When unconditional momentum trades are in the opposite direction of arbitrageur
trades, the demand from momentum traders can slow price convergence and may
push prices further away from fundamental value. From the arbitrageur’s perspective,
unconditional momentum trading can cause mispricing to deepen and thus represents
a risk similar to noise trader risk (e.g. DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1990) and Shleifer and Summers (1990)). Like noise trader risk, arbitrageurs may
not be able to directly observe momentum trading activity. However, arbitrageurs
2The arbitrageur’s capital allocation choice is consistent with the model of Kondor (2009) where
a strictly positive probability of a loss results in an optimal capital allocation which may not
completely eliminate the mispricing in a given arbitrage opportunity. This is also consistent with the
impact of noise trader risk on arbitrage activity (e.g. De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann
(1990) and Shleifer and Summers (1990)).
3Demand pressure from arbitrage-reinforcing momentum trades pushes prices towards predicted
fundamental value regardless of whether apparent misvaluation is due to ”true” mispricing or omit-
ted risk factors. Arbitrage traders do not directly observe mispricing and may also trade apparently
misvalued securities pushing them towards peer or industry-average valuations. All else equal, the
combined trading activity should reduce the actual level of mispricing.
4Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) develop a model of synchronization risk where holding costs
compel competitive arbitrageurs to strategically time their trades based on their expectations of
other arbitrageur trading activity resulting in delayed arbitrage. In a similar manner, arbitrageurs
may time the market by conditioning their trades on the expectations of the level and direction of
momentum trading activity where expectations are based on observed past returns.
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can infer the direction and intensity of momentum trading by observing past returns.
Thus, it seems reasonable that past returns can lead to a reduction in arbitrage
intensity if arbitrageurs condition their level of investment on past returns.
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